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This dissertation integrates Network Exchange Theory (NET) with Social Value 
Orientations (SVO) literature.  Previous SVO research has consistently found strong 
differences between prosocial and proself actors in social dilemmas and similar settings.  
That research has not, however, examined the behavior of actors engaging in negotiated 
exchange.  Willer, Gladstone, and Berigan (2013) derived metric predictions for 
embedding actors of differing social values within exchange structures.  I followed their 
work by testing these predictions in laboratory experiments using three types of exchange 
structures.  While the predictions anticipated strong differences in earnings between 
orientation types, the results suggested otherwise.  The earnings of prosocials and 
proselfs were instead generally indistinguishable.  A second experiment placed actors 
with differing social values in exchange structures that allowed for coalition formation; 
here, too, there were greater similarities than differences between SVO types. Why do the 
findings from these experiments contradict the extensive body of research on social 
values which has found strong differences between SVO types?  Why was NET, which 
also has a long history of supported predictions, not able to accurately anticipate the 
behavior of actors with social values?  My goals in this dissertation are to examine the 
potential explanations for these findings and provide suggestions for further research 
which would explore additional conditions under which prosocials and proselfs will act in 
a similar, rather than different, manner.  I argue that social structures override individual 
differences.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: AN INTEGRATION OF TWO THEORIES 
Both exchange theories such as Network Exchange Theory and rational choice theories 
had, at one time, recognized only the ‘economic man’ model, one who is narrowly self-
interested (Von Neumann and Morgenstern ([1944] 2004; Willer and Anderson 1981; 
Willer 1992; Willer and Emanuelson 2008).  Scholars such as Roth suggest that this is a 
reasonable and “useful approximation of behavior” (1995:78).  Nevertheless, not all cases 
can be explained using the narrowly rational, self-interested actor.  There are multiple 
instances of behavior which are not self-interested, and would be seen as ‘irrational’ 
following the narrow rationality model.  For instance, players in the Dictator Game 
sometimes transfer points to their ostensible partners, while the rational egoist model 
predicts that they should give zero.  Players also sometimes choose to cooperate in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, in which defection is predicted as the rational choice 
(Henrich et al. 2001; Sally 1995).   
There is a body of literature which recognizes not one, but multiple types of 
rationality. Social Value Orientations research postulates three types of rationality, only 
one of which, the individualist, corresponds to the narrowly rational actor.  This research 
also recognizes the prosocial and competitive types.
1
  
                                                             
1 While it is conventional in most of the SVO literature to place emphasis on the three major orientation 
types, some researchers recognize additional types or subtypes, such as masochism, aggression, martyrdom, 
altruists, and reciprocators (McClintock and Van Avermaet 1982; Kurzban and Houser 2001; Perugini and 
Gallucci 2001; Van Lange 2004.) 
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These orientation types seek, respectively, equality with the maximization of joint 
outcomes and the maximum difference in outcomes between self and other.  This 
recognition of multiple types of rationality developed in part as a reaction to the narrowly 
rational actor model and as an explanation of other-regarding (rather than self-interested) 
behaviors seen in experimental settings (Messick and McClintock 1968; Au and Kwong 
2004). 
Of interest in this dissertation is the integration of Network Exchange Theory and 
Social Value Orientations literature.  In the following sections, I review Network 
Exchange Theory (hereafter NET) and Social Value Orientations (hereafter SVO), 
emphasizing major theoretical concepts and general research findings.  I conclude with a 
discussion of the potential benefits of such an integration, such as expansion of scope 
within the Network Exchange Theory framework and generating new predictions for the 
inclusion of differing social values within exchange networks. 
  
ELEMENTARY THEORY AND NETWORK EXCHANGE THEORY 
Elementary Theory (Willer and Anderson 1981; Willer 1984, 1999; Willer and 
Emanuelson 2008) is a sociological theory which models social relations between actors 
in social structures.  Elementary Theory investigates structures composed of the 
following three types of relations that are differentiated by the types of sanctions flowing 
between actors: exchange, coercion, and conflict.  In this section, I will explain actors and 
sanctions in social relations within structures, and then turn my discussion to concepts 




Actors and Sanctions in Social Relations 
Theoretic models are developed for actors and social relations in social structures 
examined by Elementary Theory.  Actors are entities, such as individuals or firms, which 
occupy positions in networks.  Actors can transmit sanctions to one another.  A sanction 
is an action “which alters the ‘preference state’ of the actor receiving the sanction” 
(Willer 1999:24).  Arrows and value signs model the direction of the sanction and 
positive or negative value.  A positive sanction is a social action that an actor wants to 
receive, such as money.  A negative sanction is a social action that an actor does not want 
to receive, such as an insult.   
Conflict, coercion, and exchange relations are differentiated by these positive and 
negative sanctions.  Conflict and exchange are marked by a two-way flow of sanctions, 
negative sanctions and positive sanctions, respectively.  Coercion is modeled as a one-
way flow of either a positive or a negative sanction.  
A coercive relation involves two positions and two types of sanctions – the 
coercer, holding a negative sanction and the coercee, with a positive sanction.  Willer 
asserts that “coercers use threat of transmission of the negative to extract the positive 
from the coercee” (1999:27).  The coercer threatens the transmission of a negative 
sanction, such as a gunshot, in order to receive the transmission of a positive sanction, 
such as a wallet, from the coercee.  In a coercive relation, only one of these sanctions is 
transmitted.  If the threat is believed, the positive sanction will be sent to the coercer.  At 
agreement, when the mugger’s threat to shoot is believed, the person to whom the threat 
is directed will give up his/her wallet.  Alternatively, when agreement is not reached, not 
the positive sanction but the negative sanction is sent. 
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Conflict occurs when actors paired in a relation hold negative sanctions that may 
be sent to one another.  According to Willer, in “conflict, because the two sanctions are 
negative, neither actor benefits when the sanction of the other is transmitted.  Therefore, 
agreements are concerned with the conditions under which no sanctions flow” (1999:27).  
In confrontation, when the actors cannot reach an agreement, both will send their 
negative sanctions.  Conflict can sometimes precede a coercive relation.  For example, 
the victorious group in a tribal conflict has the ability to extract resources from the 
defeated group through coercion. 
Exchange relations, like conflict relations, are modeled as a two-way flow of 
sanctions.  In exchange, however, sanctions are positive.  Actors in an exchange relation 
each seek to receive a positive sanction from the other.  For example, a car dealer wishes 
to receive money from a buyer.  A potential buyer enters the relation in order to purchase 
(receive) a new car from the dealership.  Importantly, in economic exchange relations 
such as the purchase of a new car, the relation “is composed of ‘negative-positive 
sanctions’” (Willer 1999:28).  To expand,  
When A sends a positively valued resource to B, that transmission is a loss that is 
reflected in the negative transmission sign.  B positively values the resource, so its 
reception is a gain and the reception sign is positive.  Exactly the same is the case 
for the sanction linking B to A . . . and, in economic exchange, actors positively 
value both resources moving between them (Willer 1999:28). 
Therefore, the dealer values both the car s/he is selling and the money given for the car.  
The same can be said for the buyer.  Yet if confrontation occurs because they cannot 
reach an agreement on the purchase price, neither will benefit from the relation. 
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Network Exchange Theory (NET) developed as an “outgrowth of the elementary 
theory of social structures” due to the increasing focus “on power in exchange networks” 
(Walker et al. 2000:324).  I now turn my discussion to power conditions and research 
within the NET framework. 
 
NET Terms and Research 
Network Exchange Theory has found seven power conditions, five of which are 
connection types: exclusive connection, inclusive connection, null connection, inclusive-
exclusive connection, inclusive-null connection, ordering, and hierarchy/mobility (Patton 
and Willer 1990; Szmatka and Willer 1995; Willer 1999; Bell, Walker, and Willer 2000; 
Corra 2000; Walker et al. 2000).  Willer (1999) provides an N, M, and Q typology for the 
five connection types to describe the number of connections for a position in a network 
and the number of possible exchanges. Using this typology, “[f]or any node i, Ni is the 
number of connected exchange relations; Mi is the maximum number of relations from 
which the node can benefit; and Qi is the minimum number of exchanges that must be 
completed if the node is to gain benefits” (Walker et al. 2000:325).    
Actor i is “exclusively connected when Ni > Mi ≥ Qi = 1” (Willer 1999:53).  For 
example, consider position A in the branching structure in Figure 1.1B.  Position A has 
three connected exchange relations, thus N = 3.  This position is exclusively connected 
when its maximum number of exchanges (M) is less than 3, and must exchange with at 
most one to benefit (Q); A can exchange with only one or two of the peripheral 
connections. Then one or two of the peripheral positions will be excluded from exchange.  
Because of exclusion, the central A position is advantaged.  Each of the peripherals in  
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Figure 1.1 Study 1 Exchange Networks.  
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this structure is singularly connected; thus Ni = Mi = Qi = 1.  None has another exchange 
relation from which to benefit if an agreement with A is not reached.  Therefore, the 
peripherals will compete with each other to avoid being excluded, sending the central 
position increasingly better offers.   
Actor i is “null connected when Ni = Mi > Qi = 1” (Willer 1999:53).  Like 
exclusion, null connection is “defined by comparing the number of relations incident at i 
to the largest number in which i can benefit” (Willer 1999:198).  In this comparison of N 
and M, “[w]hen Ni = Mi the connection is null and none of i’s partners must be excluded” 
(Willer 1999:198).  Position A in Figure 1.1B is null connected when it can exchange 
with any or all of its relations and can benefit independently from each exchange.  
Therefore, changing the number of relations null connected at a node will not affect the 
power exercise.   
Actor i is “inclusively connected when Ni = Mi = Qi > 1” (Willer 1999:53).  It 
should be noted that inclusion alters the value of Q from being equal to one, as is the case 
for exclusion and null connection.  Actor i is inclusively connected “when Qi, the 
minimum number of relations in which i must exchange, is larger than one” (Willer 
1999:199).  Inclusion occurs when a position must exchange with all of a set of related 
actors in order to benefit.  Returning to Figure 1.1B, Position A is inclusively connected 
when it must exchange with all three relations in order to benefit from any.  The 
peripheral positions are powerful in an inclusive structure; if any peripheral rejects 
exchange, the central position cannot benefit.  
 NET employs Elementary Theory’s principle that “all social actors act to 
maximize their expected preference state alteration” (Willer 1999:30).  The Resistance 
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factor captures the social actor’s interest in maximizing, but also in avoiding the costs of 
confrontation.  The Resistance equation is used to generate predictions for exchange 
ratios in relations.  To generate such a prediction, we first must determine two initial 
conditions, Pmax and Pcon for each position.  Pmax is an actor’s best hope or best payoff in 
a relation, while Pcon represents payoff at confrontation, in which an agreement cannot be 
reached.  A resistance factor can be calculated for any actor by weighing the best hope in 
an agreement with the worst fear, or cost of not exchanging.  We can solve for the 
exchange rate in a relation by setting two actors’ resistance factors equal to each other, 
following Principle 2 of the theory.
2
 
In a typical NET experiment, participants occupying positions are in a “resource 
pool relation” (Willer 1999:8).  A pool of resources is located between a pair of positions, 
but neither position owns or holds these resources (often framed as “points” to 
experimental participants).  Actors make offers of resource divisions between self and 
other.  When an exchange is completed, each actor receives the agreed upon amount as a 
payoff.  If an agreement cannot be reached, the resource pool is not divided and neither 
actor receives a payoff.  A power exercise occurs when one actor benefits at the expense 
of the other (Willer 1999).
3
  Power differences occur due to conditions of the structures. 
In more than one thousand experimental sessions, the metric predictions of NET 
have been routinely supported (Patton and Willer 1990; Markovsky et al. 1993; Skvoretz 
and Willer 1993; Willer and Skvoretz 1997; Willer 1999; Walker et al. 2000; Willer and 
Emanuelson 2008).  25 years of experience have resulted in well-proven theory and 
associated procedures; it is quite clear that the research paradigm captures dynamics and 
                                                             
2 The Resistance equation is revisited in Chapter 2 with a modeled example. 
3 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of equal, weak, and strong power structures. 
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outcomes predicted by NET.  In fact, a recent comprehensive comparison of ten 
exchange theories showed NET to be the most precise and to have the broadest scope of 
applicability (Willer and Emanuelson 2008).  The scope of NET is much broader than the 
other exchange theories for it has formulated and investigated, not just one, but seven 
structural power conditions (Willer and Emanuelson 2008).  
 
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATIONS: WHAT ARE THEY AND HOW ARE THEY 
STUDIED? 
In this section, I first define social values and review the three major orientation types. I 
then review the main assessments of SVOs and key research findings.  I conclude this 
section with some of the typical explanations of why the different orientation types so 
frequently produce contrasting behaviors in experimental settings. 
  
Defining Social Values 
According to Liebrand and McClintock, “different individuals assign different weights to 
their own and to others’ outcomes” (1988:397).   Based on these weights, we can assign 
orientation types to actors.  These orientations are typically viewed as preferences for 
how outcomes should affect self and other (Liebrand 1986; Liebrand and McClintock 
1988; Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck 2008).   
Bogaert et al. (2008) offer definitions for the three major orientation types.  When 
choosing between outcome options, prosocials express other-regarding concerns and 
“strive to maximize joint outcomes and equality in outcomes” (2008:456).  Prosocials 
also make decisions such that the difference between self and other is minimized.  
 
10 
Individualists “strive to maximize their own outcome only” (2008:456).  The 
individualist is narrowly self-interested in that s/he is only concerned with his or her own 
payoffs, and not the outcomes for the other.   
Competitors “strive to maximize their own gains relative to other’s gains” 
(2008:456).  The competitor’s preference state is highest when he or she gains maximally 
relative to the other, without regard to the amount of the competitor’s outcome.  For 
instance, consider that a competitor can choose payoffs for self and other, and has 2 
choices.  In option A, the competitor can earn 10 points and the other can earn 7 points.  
In option B, the competitor can earn 7 points, and the other can earn 1 point.  Option B is 
preferred for the competitor because it provides the greater difference in payoffs, despite 
the fact that 7 is suboptimal relative to 10.   
From these definitions, it becomes clear that prosocials and competitors base their 
preferences on a comparison of self and other’s potential outcomes, while the 
individualist’s preferences are based on a ranking of outcomes affecting self alone.  It 
should be noted, though, that because individualists and competitors act similarly in 
many experimental conditions and are both considered self-interested orientations, they 
are frequently collapsed into a single type, the proself (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; 
Smeesters et al. 2003; Simpson 2004; Simpson and R. Willer 2008).   
That these orientation types are stable, fundamental traits is frequently accepted 
throughout the SVO literature (Messick and McClintock 1968; Bogaert et al. 2008).  This 
is sometimes explained through assumed genetic origins.  An individual is thought to be 
biologically predisposed to a particular orientation type, self- or other-regarding (Van 
Lange et al. 1997; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Smeesters et al. 2003).  Researchers 
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also point to the temporal stability of SVO found in test-retest studies (Sheldon 1999; 
Van Lange 2000).  Van Lange (2000) notes two test-retest studies of varying lengths of 
time which reflected temporal stability.  Van Lange and Semin-Goossens (1998) found 
that 75% of study participants maintained their SVO over a period of 6 months; a similar 
study found that almost 59% of study participants expressed the same SVO when retested 
after a 19 month period.  Although these results reflected less temporal stability, this 
percentage was still comparable to that found for other factors considered to be stable 
traits, such as attachment style (Van Lange 1999). 
Importantly, some of the SVO research shows that these orientations are prone to 
manipulation (Johnson et al. 1981; Bogaert et al. 2008).  While SVO can be seen as a 
stable and consistent trait in many situations, individuals’ choices may be dampened or 
overwhelmed by particular conditions.  SVO has been found to be subject to influence 
from framing, priming, and other situational conditions (Hertel and Fiedler 1994; Van 
Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange 2000; Smeesters et al. 2003). Therefore, it is argued that 
predictions must be grounded in orientation and the conditions of the situation.   
 
SVO Assessments and Research Findings 
Extensive SVO research supports the predicted differences between orientation types.  
The majority of this research places participants in games and social dilemmas.  Social 
dilemmas are situations in which the individual’s interests are at odds with the collective 
interests.  An individual may choose to maximize his or her own gains, but this will 
reduce the collective gain (Schroeder 1995; Komorita and Parks 1996).  The most 
common assessments of SVO include decomposed games and the Ring Measure 
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(Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Liebrand and McClintock 1988; De Bruin and Van Lange 
1999; Van Lange 1999; Simpson 2004; Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf 2011).  
Choices made in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Dictator Game have also been shown 
to be indicative of orientation type differences, although they are not used as assessments 
to measure SVO (Poundstone 1992). 
 The Ring Measure (Liebrand 1986; Liebrand and McClintock 1988; Van Lange 
1999) is an assessment of choice preferences which takes into account utility functions 
capturing consideration of outcomes for self and other.  Study participants are presented 
with multiple pairs of options (typically 24) for monetary allotments to self and a partner.  
These outcomes may be positive or negative; for example, a participant may choose 
between 10 dollars for self and 10 dollars for other or 13 dollars for self and -7 dollars for 
other.   
An individual’s choices are then mapped onto an outcome plane based on the 
calculated weights assigned to self and other.  Location on the plane determines 
orientation type, but at least 60% of the choices must be consistent for classification.  
Each quadrant on the plane corresponds to how individuals value positive and negative 
outcomes for self and other.  For example, the top right quadrant covers positive 
outcomes for both self and other, suggesting a cooperative orientation.  Figure 1.2 
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Decomposed games are the most common measure of SVO.  The most frequent 
decomposed game assessment is the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values (Van 
Lange and Kuhlman 1994; De Bruin and Van Lange 1999; Van Lange 1999; Simpson 
2004; Bogaert et al. 2008) known also in similar forms as the Nine Item Social Value 
Inventory.  In this measure, respondents are presented with 9 decisions, each with 3 
options from which to choose. 
Within a decision round, each outcome option corresponds to one of the major 
orientation types.  For example, a participant must select between the following three 
options: 1) 500 points for self and 500 points for other (prosocial choice), 2) 540 points 
for self and 280 points for other (individualist choice), and 3) 480 points for self and 80 
points for other (competitor choice).  Option 1 corresponds to the prosocial orientation as 
it allows for equal outcomes.  Option 2 represents an individualist choice because it 
provides the respondent with the highest payoff outcome to self.  Option 3 corresponds to 
a competitive orientation because it allows the respondent to have the largest advantage 
over the other.  Participants must make consistent decisions in 6 out of 9 rounds in order 
to be classified.  This classification is somewhat more stringent than the Ring Measure, as 
it requires 66.67% consistency in participants’ responses, compared to the 60% response 
consistency of the Ring Measure.   
That the Ring Measure and the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values both 
require less than 100% consistency for classification suggests that test-retest reliability of 
SVOs should be high.  Even with some degree of drift among responses, participants can 
still be classified as the same orientation type at Time 1 and Time 2.  That test-retest 
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reliability is frequently lower than 100% correspondence adds support to the argument 
that social values are flexible states.  
Empirical studies have found differences between prosocials and proselfs in 
cooperation levels, expectations, and negotiation strategies.  Not surprisingly, prosocials 
are more cooperative than proselfs and share more resources in the Dictator and Public 
Goods games.  These games measure cooperation by asking participants if they would be 
willing to share points or resources with a partner or a collective (De Cremer and Van 
Lange 2001; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange and Visser 1999; Fisman, Kariv, and 
Markovits 2007).  
 Simpson and R. Willer (2008), however, found that situational conditions can 
increase the amount of resources shared by proselfs in a Dictator Game.  The authors 
found that “[e]goists act prosocially when reputational incentives are at stake” (2008:37).  
In Study One, participants who had been classified as altruists or egoists first played a 
Dictator Game for a measure of prosocial behavior.  Next, “a new (third) participant 
ostensibly decided how much of a $12 resource pool to send to the participant” 
(2008:41).  To establish reputational incentives, Simpson and R. Willer (2008) created 
public and private conditions for this second phase.  In the private condition, study 
participants were told that their decision in the first phase would not be shared with this 
new participant.  In the public condition, concern for reputation was introduced by 
informing participants that this new participant would know their decision in the first 
phase.  Egoists in the public condition shared significantly more resources than egoists in 
the private condition, supporting the argument that establishing a prosocial reputation is 
expected to lead to a higher payoff in the second phase of the public condition. 
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 Research investigating expectations asks how participants of varying SVOs will 
expect perceived partners to act based on skills or characteristics, and how participants 
will behave toward these ostensible partners.  De Bruin and Van Lange (1999) found that 
when prosocials believed their partners were moral, they expected greater cooperation 
and they were willing to be even more cooperative.
4
  Proselfs expected greater levels of 
cooperation when they faced unintelligent partners.   
Utz, Ouwerkerk, and Van Lange (2004) also explored how orientation types 
might respond differently to intelligent or unintelligent partners.  Prosocials responded 
with greater cooperation when they were led to believe their partners were competent, 
and their actions were more sensitive to partners’ strategies.  When proselfs (in this case, 
competitors) were primed with competence, they reduced their cooperation and exploited 
their partners more often.  Another study found support for a “false consensus effect,” a 
trend in which proself and prosocial participants expected others to share their orientation 
(Iedema and Poppe 1994:573).  While the frequency of false consensus differed, 
prosocials more frequently expected others to be prosocial rather than proself, and 
proselfs more frequently expected others to be proself rather than prosocial. 
 Some SVO research has examined differences in negotiation and found that the 
strategies of prosocials are more closely tied to fairness.  De Dreu and Van Lange (1995) 
reported that prosocials demanded less, conceded more often, more often viewed their 
partners as fair, and expressed concern for their partners’ outcomes, as compared to 
proselfs.  In a study by Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), prosocial and proself participants 
played Prisoner’s Dilemma games with computers programmed to cooperate all the time, 
                                                             
4 De Bruin and Van Lange define ‘morality’ as a “social desirability” dimension based on “a tendency to be 




defect all the time, or play tit-for-tat (Axelrod 1984).  Prosocials cooperated most often, 
but adjusted their strategy when they encountered the defection strategy.  Proselfs were 
less inclined to adjust their negotiation strategies, but individualists were more likely than 
competitors to cooperate with tit-for-tat. 
 
Why Do Prosocials and Proselfs Differ? 
Why do these differences between prosocials and proselfs exist?  I now review the major 
explanations for these differences.  First, some researchers claim that actors with 
differing orientation types view games differently.  In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, proselfs will 
tend to view defection as the rational choice.  Prosocials, however, assign a different 
payoff matrix to this game.  For this orientation, cooperation is perfectly rational 
(Liebrand 1986).  Simpson (2004) makes a similar claim.  Proselfs view the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma payoff matrix as the standard game, while prosocials tend to transform the 
payoffs into an Assurance game where the dominant strategy is cooperation. 
 Actors with differing orientation types are also thought to have different 
individual inclinations toward action.  For example, De Cremer and Van Lange (2001) 
explain differences in cooperation with inclination toward social responsibility.  
Prosocials feel a much greater sense of social responsibility, which is why they want to 
contribute more often than do proselfs and improve the collective interest.  Others claim 
that behavioral differences are a result of different inclinations toward cooperation.  
Individuals who are identified as prosocial express a greater willingness to act 
cooperatively (Van Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf 2004).  In general, it is frequently 
asserted that we should routinely observe behavioral differences between prosocial and 
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proself orientation types because they undergo contrasting cognitive processes when 
making decisions. 
 
INTEGRATING NET AND SVO 
As reviewed above, both theories have a long history of research supported by 
experimental findings.  Previous research in SVO has firmly established that social 
values produce strong effects in various games and social dilemmas (Bogaert et al. 2008; 
De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Simpson and Willer 
2008; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange et al. 1997).  Likewise, the NET experimental setting 
has been used countless times to test exchange theories. Those experiments firmly 
supported NET.  
 If both bodies of literature have routinely demonstrated consistent experimental 
support over time, what is the objective of this dissertation research?  What knowledge is 
left to be discovered from these heavily researched areas?  First, the integration of SVO 
and NET offers the possibility of expanding the scope of NET to include multiple types 
of rationality, beyond the narrowly rational actor model.  The fact that there is evidence 
of individuals engaging in other-regarding behaviors (seemingly “irrational” behavior) 
suggests that we should consider modifying NET equations to allow for multiple 
preferences.  Willer asserts that “[w]hen a social relation is embedded in one type of 
structure, people produce one kind of behavior” (1999:xiii).  The inclusion of differing 




 Second, the study of SVO within NET structures provides the opportunity to 
investigate how people of differing SVOs might differently relate to power.  Power, as 
stated by Russell, “is the fundamental concept in social science” (1938:4).  It has been 
identified in the past as both control of another actor (Weber [1918] 1968) and benefit at 
the expense of another (Marx [1867] 1967).  In this dissertation, power is defined as an 
outcome which is “more favorable to one actor and less favorable to another than an 
equipower baseline rate” (Willer 1992:191).
5
   
 In previous research, some exchange networks have routinely produced the 
exercise of power by certain people over others. Now consider an actor who favors 
equality and outcomes which are beneficial to self and other who is placed in a powerful 
position in an exchange structure.  Will the actor succumb to the temptation of exploiting 
others, or will s/he seek equality?  If the former, has the actor been affected by the kind of 
interactions that occur in exchange relations as actors seek agreement?  We can also 
consider actors occupying equal power positions in a dyad.  If a proself is paired with a 
prosocial, how might the negotiation process be altered?  Will the proself have the 




 Furthermore, the following research integrating SVO and NET provides a new 
test of SVO effects.  To my knowledge, negotiation within economic exchange relations 
has not yet been investigated.  Previous SVO research has focused on mixed-motive 
                                                             
5 It should be noted that Willer’s (1992) assertion does not compare actors’ utilities, unlike the concept of 
equipower utilized in Power-Dependence Theory, which does compare actors’ utilities (Emerson 1962; 
Cook and Yamagishi 1992). 
6 Chen et al. (2001) investigated a similar set of questions in their study of differing conceptualizations of 
power.  Communally oriented individuals “associate power with self-oriented goals,” while exchange 
oriented individuals see power “linked to social responsibility goals” (173).  The actions of participants 
primed with power corresponded to the power-related goals specific to their orientation. 
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social dilemmas where differing SVOs have resulted in highly contrasting behaviors. The 
study of SVO within NET structures provides the opportunity to investigate how people 
of different SVOs behave in a different mixed- motive environment.  Exchange relations, 
too, have mixed motives.  In both settings, actors’ interests are opposed but also 
complementary (Weber [1918] 1968; Willer 1999).  The interest situation of exchange 
relations differs in one important regard from the settings of most previous SVO 
research: resource divisions in exchange experiments are zero sum games. 
 The outline of the dissertation is as follows.  In the three following chapters, I will 
provide a more detailed explanation of how NET and SVO theoretical elements are 
integrated, present two experimental studies which embedded actors of differing 
orientations in exchange networks, and then discuss possible reasons for why these 
findings so often contrast with the majority of the SVO literature.   
Chapter 2 explains how we can test for SVO effects in exchange structures, 
beginning with a review of metric predictions for combinations of SVO actors in multiple 
types of networks.  Next, I review the experimental design and results of my first 
dissertation study.  In this experiment, participants of varying SVOs were placed into 
exchange networks.  Despite the extensive amount of research on social values, this is the 
first time orientation types have been examined within such social relations.  Study 1 
placed actors of differing SVOs into one of three types of exchange networks.  The 




                                                             




Chapter 3 follows with Study 2, which compared coalition formation between 
groups of prosocials and groups of proselfs in exchange networks.   The results of this 
experiment were similar to those of Study 1; rather than revealing strong differences 
between prosocials and proselfs, these resulted tended to suggest commonalities.  I 
conclude Chapter 3 by asking why this set of experiments produced findings which differ 
so greatly from the majority of SVO research.   
Chapter 4 provides two possible explanations for such an overlap of behavior 
between proselfs and prosocials. These explanations are not intended to be exhaustive or 
definitive, but rather possibilities which could be tested at a future date.  As I explain in 
the chapter, one of these explanations, that prosocials may experience cognitive overload 
when managing multiple relations, can be tested in the sociology laboratory.  The other 
explanation suggests that different structural and situational conditions produce different 
sets of behaviors, and have the potential to override individual proclivities.  I will argue 
that the most likely explanation is that social structural conditions prescribe what should 
be considered rational behavior; in the case of economic exchange, social structural 
conditions call forth proself behavior.  Then, I discuss the implications of the dissertation 
research, such as support for the recognition of SVO as a flexible trait that is subject to 
situational influences.  I conclude the chapter by considering future research directions 




TESTING SVOs IN EXCHANGE STRUCTURES: STUDY ONE 
A body of literature on Social Value Orientations (hereafter SVO) postulates three 
orientations to rational action: the individualist, the prosocial, and the competitor.  These 
orientations are preferences for how outcomes should affect self and other (Liebrand 
1986; Liebrand and McClintock 1988; Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck 2008).  Only one of 
these orientations, the individualist, corresponds to the narrowly self-interested rational 
actor.  As discussed in Chapter 1, SVO effects have been studied and found in a variety 
of conditions, but, to my knowledge, have not yet been investigated in economic 
exchange. The question for this research is, “How, if at all, will SVO effects alter the 
negotiation processes and outcomes in exchange networks?” 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. I first review the SVO types and 
their utility functions.  Then SVO actors are embedded in exchange relations and 
structures.  They are embedded by reformulating NET’s Resistance equation in light of 
SVO utility functions.  As a result, new predictions for SVO actors in exchange structures 
are generated.  Here, I review how such predictions are generated for equal and strong 
power structures (Willer, Gladstone, and Berigan 2013) and offer new predictions for a 
weak power structure.   
I then introduce Study One, which placed actors of differing SVOs into exchange 
structures.  Contrary to the findings in the majority of previous SVO research, these new 
findings revealed more similarities between orientation types than differences.  
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In general, proselfs and prosocials earned similar payoffs within each type of exchange 
structure.  The most convincing evidence of SVO effects is within the analysis of 
negotiation processes.  As discussed below, prosocials and proselfs exhibited some 
moderate to significant differences in actions and timing during rounds of exchange. 
 
EMBEDDING SVO IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS 
Utility Functions 
Bogaert et al. (2008) offer definitions for the three orientation types.  Prosocials “strive to 
maximize joint outcomes and equality in outcomes.”  Individualists “strive to maximize 
their own outcome only.”  Competitors “strive to maximize their own gains relative to 
other’s gains” (2008:456).   
Following these definitions, Willer, Gladstone, and Berigan (2013) developed 
utility functions for prosocials, individualists, and competitors in terms of outcomes for 
self and other.  Where i and j are respectively self and other in an exchange relation, Ui is 
the utility of i, Pi is i’s payoff and Pj is j’s payoff, SVO actors seek to maximize the 
following utility functions: 
Individualist:  Ui = Pi        (1)              
Competitor Ui = Pi - Pj    (2) 
   Prosocial: Ui = Pi + Pj - |Pi - Pj|   (3)  
The individualist’s utility function in Equation 1 corresponds to the rational actor 
typically produced in normal NET experimental conditions.  The competitor’s utility is 
defined as a difference function which offers a particular payoff set for the competitor.  
Willer, Gladstone, and Berigan explain that  
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since any actor will exchange only if Ui > 0, the competitor will reject any 
settlement for which Pj ≥ Pi. In words, because any actor exchanges only if its 
utility is greater than zero, the competitive actor will exchange only if its payoff is 
greater than the payoff of the other with whom it is exchanging (2013:116). 
The prosocial is sometimes defined in the SVO literature as seeking maximum 
joint outcome for self and other (Kuhlman, Camic, and Cuhna 1986; Bogaert et al. 2008); 
Willer, Gladstone, and Berigan (2013) instead follow Simpson’s (2004) more complete 
definition.  Simpson recognizes the maximization of self and other’s utilities, but also the 
minimization of inequality between self and other (2004).  It is important to note that the 
prosocial’s utility function in Equation 3 captures both the additive function of seeking 
joint maximum outcomes and the minimization of difference between outcomes.  As 
Willer et al. state, “in Eq. (3), Pi + Pj is the sum in Simpson’s definition while subtracting 
the absolute value of Pi - Pj gives the minimization of outcome inequalities” (2013:116). 
 Utility has historically been defined in vague terms, if defined at all.  In some 
cases, scholars rely on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s ([1944] 2004) comparison of 
utility to satisfaction (Luce and Raiffa 1957; Willer et al. 2013).  Regardless of the lack 
of a precise definition, it should be noted that utility is not a measure to be compared 
across SVO types.  Only comparisons of utility units within SVO type are permissible 
because “utility units are particular to each individual and cannot be compared 
interpersonally” (Willer et al. 2013:117).  These within – type comparisons are possible 
because we consider each SVO type as a “theoretic person” (Willer et al. 2013:117). 
Furthermore, in generating predictions, Resistance equations make only ratio 




Embedding Utility Functions in the Resistance Equation 
Using resistance NET makes metric predictions for exchange ratios in various structures.  
The actor is modeled as balancing its interest in gaining the best possible payoff with its 
interest in avoiding confrontation, in which no exchange is completed (Willer 1984; 
Willer 1999; Willer and Emanuelson 2008).  Where Ri is actor i’s resistance, Pi is i’s 
payoff, Pimax is i’s maximum payoff (i‘s best hope), and Picon is i’s payoff at 







    (4) 
For any given Pimax and Picon, when the payoff to i is high, the actor’s resistance will be 
low.  By contrast, low payoffs produce high resistance.  Willer et al. assert that “seen 
dynamically, resistance is the extent to which the pursuit of better outcomes is inhibited 
by the avoidance of confrontation” (2013:117).  







          (5)    
When i is an individualist, and actors i’s and j’s payoffs sum to 10 and the smallest unit 
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Pmax = 9 for the individualist because that is the largest payoff when the smallest unit,  
=1, Pmax = 10 for the prosocial when that actor and its partner both gain 5, and Pmax = 8 
for the competitor when the competitor gains the maximum of 9 and its partner’s payoff 
of 1 is subtracted.  Pcon, the value at confrontation, is 0 for all types. 
 The second principle of NET states “agreements occur at the point of equal 
resistance for undifferentiated actors in a full information system” (Willer 1999:43). 
Therefore, to solve for i’s and j’s payoffs in an exchange dyad for any combination of 
SVO types, the two actors’ resistances are set equal to each other.  For example, for 
individualist A and prosocial B,  


















                (6) 
Because PA + PB = 10, substituting, PA = 6.43 and PB = 3.57.  We count this outcome as a 
power exercise because power is exercised when one actor benefits at the expense of the 
other (Cook et al. 1983; Willer 1999).  Here the proself is benefitting at the expense of 
the prosocial.  According to Willer et al. (2013), all SVO combinations, save one, result 
in unique solutions.  This exception is paired prosocials, in which a unique solution is 




                                                             
8 It is important to note that equations with absolute values will have two potential solutions because the 
absolute value must be solved by splitting the equation into two cases.  For some equations, as in a proself 
– prosocial dyad, one of the two solutions will be mathematically impossible, leaving one unique solution.  




 Willer et al. (2013) offer metric predictions for all dyadic configurations and the 
possible configurations for the Br21, a strong power structure.  Strong power structures 
have high power and low power positions.  High power positions are never excluded; low 
power positions are only connected to high power positions, and at least one low power 
position in the structure will be excluded.  As noted by Willer et al., “[w]ith one high 
power position connected to two low power positions, Br21 . . . is the simplest strong 
power structure. The high power position exchanges once, excluding one of two low 
power positions” (2013:123).   
Within the dyad, paired prosocials and paired individualists are predicted to 
exchange at equal power divisions.  Paired competitors, by contrast, are expected to 
abstain from exchange, as neither actor would agree to an equal or less than equal offer.  
Willer et al. explain that “exchange can occur iff U > 0 for both actors. But UA = PA - PB 
and UB = PB - PA. It follows that when UA > 0, UB < 0, and conversely. Two competitors 
cannot both have utilities greater than zero. Thus, they cannot exchange with each other” 
(2013:120).  Individualists and competitors are expected to exploit prosocials, and 
competitors are expected to also exercise power over individualist partners.  
The predictions for the Br21 suggest that the central, high power position will 
exercise power over peripherals, unless it is occupied by a prosocial or both peripheral 
positions are occupied by competitors.  When all positions are occupied by competitors, 
no exchanges will occur, following the above discussion of competitor dyads.  Paired 
competitors are predicted to abstain from exchange because they cannot both have 
utilities greater than zero.  Those remaining structures with a prosocial occupying the 
central position or with competitors occupying both peripheral positions are considered 
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egalitarian; “their equilibrium exchange ratios are 5 – 5” (Willer et al. 2013:124).  
Prosocial centrals are predicted to negotiate in such a way that exploitation is avoided in 
the structure; Willer et al. (2013:124) assert that “the central prosocial uses its power 
position to impose equality” (italics in original).  When an individualist occupies the 
central position and both peripherals are competitors, the structure is essentially 
egalitarian in that it is expected to iterate to conditions close to an equal exchange ratio, 
but “slightly more favorable to the” competitors (Willer et al. 2013:124). 
 
Developing Predictions for the 4-Line 
Willer et al. (2013) do not offer predictions for weak power structures, whose resource 
divisions fall between those of equal power structures such as the dyad, and the extreme 
divisions of strong power structures.  Therefore, I developed predictions for the 4-Line 
network using their SVO utility functions.    
The 4-Line network has two central positions connected to each other, with each 
connected to a peripheral position which has no other connections.  Figure 1.1C displays 
this network.  The exchanges which can occur in the 4-Line under a 1-exchange rule are 
as follows: the two central B positions can exchange with each other, excluding the 
peripheral A positions, or the structure may break into dyads if one A – B relation first 
completes an exchange.  Markovsky and colleagues explain why resource divisions in 
weak power structures such as the 4-Line do not approach strong power divisions.  They 
assert that  
weak power structures ensure that either all positions are prone to exclusion (as in 
the kite), or that no position – not even a position that of structural necessity is 
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never excluded (e.g., A in the stem) – is assured of being able to exclude another 
without cost. Thus, the certainty of exclusions in strong power networks is 
replaced by the possibility of exclusions in weak power networks (1993:202). 
  I embedded the utility functions of the three SVO types into the resistance factors 
for the A and B positions of the 4-Line to develop predictions for the various symmetric 
combinations of orientations, both pure and mixed.  In a symmetric 4-Line, the actors 
occupying the central B positions are of the same SVO type, the actors occupying the 
peripheral A positions are of the same SVO type, and the SVOs of As and Bs are 
different in a mixed structure and the same in a pure structure.  I will first review how 
predictions for weak power are formulated, and then explain how SVO effects were 
accounted for in my predictions. 
 Lovaglia and colleagues (1999) modify the Resistance equation to predict 
resource divisions in weak power structures.  First, the Resistance equation for actor i 








where M is substituted for Pmax as the term for ‘best hope’ and C is substituted for Pcon as 
the term for ‘worst fear’ for actor i.   
 Lovaglia and colleagues present a modified Resistance equation to account for 
weak power by “first identifying theoretical restrictions for Ci and Mi” and assigning a 
likelihood of being included in exchange (1999:167).  Specifically,  
within these theoretical limits . . . Ci and Mi are proportional to an actor’s 
likelihood of being included in exchange.  That is, an actor’s expectations for 
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profit, her worst fears and best hopes, depend on how often she expects to be 
included in profitable exchange (1999:167). 
The way an actor’s best hope and worst fear in a 4-Line network are modified is 
as follows.  A key feature in weak power networks is that “actors cannot consistently 
exclude others from exchange without themselves suffering losses” (Lovaglia et al. 
1999:168).  This condition limits the range of values for an actor’s conflict outcome; “the 
lower limit is zero – the amount an excluded actor receives – and the upper limit is half 
the total resource pool” (Lovaglia et al. 1999:168).  Lovaglia and colleagues express the 
modified Mi as restricted to a range between and inclusive of half the resource pool up to 
the total resource pool.  The lower limit is set as such because “half the pool is always a 
competitor because no actor is ever consistently excluded” (Lovaglia et al. 1999:168). 
These two terms are further modified by factoring in the likelihood of being 
included in exchange because of the assumption that these expectations are proportional 
to actors’ likelihoods of exchanging.  The Resistance-Likelihood Assumption states “the 
higher an actor’s likelihood of being included in exchange, (a) the higher the actor’s 
perceived conflict outcome, Ci; and (b) the higher the actor’s maximum profit 




             
 
 
   
where l represents likelihood of being included in exchange and P is the size of the profit 
pool.  Actors’ likelihood values will vary depending on position in the network. Central B 
positions are predicted to be always included, with a calculated likelihood of 1; peripheral 
positions are calculated to have a likelihood of being included in exchange of 0.75 
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(Lovaglia et al. 1999).  Substituting for M and C, and with Pi representing payoff, the 
Resistance equation for actor i in a 4-Line is  
   
 
 
         
   
 
   
 
As with other relations, resource divisions are solved by setting the resistance factors of 
two actors equal to each other. 
 To embed SVO effects in the 4-Line Resistance equation presented above, I 
follow Willer et al. (2013) by replacing Pi, the payoff term, in the numerator and 
denominator with the utility function for each SVO type. 
When actor i is an individualist, the equation above remains unchanged.  When 
actor i is a prosocial,  
     
 
 
                        
                
 
   
 
When actor i is a competitor, 
    
 
 
              
        
 
   
 
To solve any SVO combination of the dyadic A—B portion of a 4-Line network, first 
substitute the SVO utilities for the payoff terms, then adjust the resistance factor to 
account for likelihood of being included in exchange based on network position.   
For example, consider the division of 37 points between a competitor occupying 
the peripheral A position, with a 0.75 likelihood of being included in exchange, and a 
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prosocial occupying the central B position, with a likelihood of 1.
9
  Where RCA is the 
resistance of the peripheral competitor, PC is the competitor’s payoff term, RPB is the 
resistance of the central prosocial, and PP is the prosocial’s payoff term,  
    
  
 
                
        
  
 




                       
                
  
 
   
     
and solving for PC, the competitor is predicted to earn 26.59 points, despite occupying the 
lower power position, with the prosocial earning 10.41.  Note that the competitor is 
predicted to exercise power from a lower power position. Table 2.1 presents the complete 
set of predictions for all A –B configurations. 
From these predictions, it follows that prosocial centrals will exercise power over 
prosocial peripherals, but this A – B pairing is the closest to an equal resource division.  
A more surprising prediction is that prosocials should be exploited by individualists and 
competitors, regardless of location in the 4-Line network.  Competitors are also expected 
to benefit when paired with individualists.  Following Willer et al. (2013), competitors 
are predicted to abstain from exchange with each other.
10
  It is important to note that two 
major expectations follow from this full set of predictions embedding SVO effects into 
exchange networks: prosocials will seek resource divisions which approach equality, thus  
resisting temptation to exploit, and proselfs will routinely exploit prosocials when 
possible.   
                                                             
9 The use of 37 points is a departure from typical NET resource pools of 24 points.  This departure is 
explained in Study 1. 
10 While competitors have been predicted to abstain from exchange with each other, I analyzed 4-Lines 
with competitors occupying the central B positions without breaking them into separate dyads.  I analyzed 
these 4-Lines with the assumption that the threat of the B – B exchange between competitors could be used 
to gain a more favorable exchange with the peripheral.  If analyzed as two dyads, a central competitor 




Table 2.1 4-Line Predictions. 
Configuration (A—B—B—A)  Exchange Rate for A-B relation 
P—P—P—P  17.34 – 19.66  
I—I—I—I  16.06 – 20.94 
C—C—C—C  No Exchange 
I—P—P—I  23.13 – 13.87 
C—P—P—C  26.59 – 10.41 
P—I—I—P  10.79 – 26.21 
C—I—I—C  23.13 – 13.87  
P—C—C—P  8.09 – 28.91  
I—C—C—I  
 
10.79 – 26.21 
 
Key: 
P = Prosocial 
I = Individualist 






STUDY 1: DO PROSOCIALS AND PROSELFS REACH DIFFERENT 
AGREEMENTS AND DO THEY NEGOTIATE DIFFERENTLY? 
In this section, I will first describe the methods of Study 1, which placed actors of 
differing SVOs into one of three exchange networks.  The first step was to measure 
participants’ SVOs.  In the second step I placed participants in light of their orientations 
into equal power dyads, the strong power Br31, or the weak power 4-Line.  Figure 1.1 
displays these networks.  I will discuss the conditions, hypotheses, and exchange ratio 
results for each structure separately.  Then I will describe the interaction processes of the 
exchange games.  As the research progressed, I also included a third part, a one-shot 
Dictator game immediately prior to and immediately following the exchange rounds as a 
check on the measuring of SVOs.  The results for the third part will be discussed last.  
 
Methods 
Participants were college undergraduates enrolled at a large state university.  The Nine 
Item Social Value Inventory was used to measure social value orientation (McClintock et 
al. 1973; Van Lange 1999).  The measure asks participants to decide how payoffs should 
be divided between the self and another.  Nine scenarios are given, each with 3 options.   
A score of 7 consistent responses out of 9 was required to identify a participant as a 
prosocial, individualist, or competitor.  I note that 7 consistent responses is one more than 
is commonly employed in SVO research (McClintock and Allison 1989; Van Lange and 
Kuhlman 1994; Van Lange et al. 1997). Those who received a consistent score were then 
contacted for the lab portion of the study.  
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 Prospective participants could take the Nine Item Social Value Inventory early in 
the semester in which the research was carried out.  In that case the Inventory was filled 
out in a classroom. Alternatively, students interested in volunteering for the study could 
take the Inventory online.  As a result, the period of time between the Inventory and 
participation in an experiment could vary widely across participants.  I felt justified in 
this design by the understanding, common across the SVO literature, that people’s social 
value orientations are stable over time (Bogaert et al. 2008; Messick and McClintock 
1968).  Nevertheless, as the research went forward, further measures of SVO were 
instituted.  As already mentioned, those new measures used the Dictator game and were 
given in the laboratory immediately prior to and immediately after the exchange 
experiment.  
 In the lab, participants were placed in individual rooms and read experimental 
instructions.  In prior NET experiments, a proself orientation was intentionally produced 
by instructing participants that “Your goal is to earn as many points as possible.”  That 
instruction was omitted for this research.  Instead, instructions suggested that they should 
“Negotiate as you see fit.”  These new instructions were given in order to allow 
participants to be guided by their social value orientations, rather than by an orientation 
cued for them. 
 Next, participants individually completed a computer tutorial for the ExNet 
program.  ExNet allows participants to view a live display of the complete network, as 
well as all offers and completed exchanges in real time.  The tutorial taught participants 
to use mouse control to make offers, counteroffers, and complete exchanges.  After 
completing the tutorial, participants began the exchange portion in which they interacted 
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with each other.  All sessions followed the ‘1-exchange rule,’ in which each participant 
could complete a maximum of one exchange per round.  Each experimental session lasted 
10 to 20 rounds.  Upon conclusion of the exchange sessions, all participants were paid by 
points earned and their questions about the research were answered. 
 In most previous research, exchange consisted of dividing a pool of 24 resources 
upon joint agreement (Cook and Emerson 1978; Willer and Emanuelson 2008).  For these 
dissertation studies the number of resources in each pool was fixed at 37.  This change 
was made in order to avoid possible priming effects for equity; 24 is obviously divisible 
by 2, whereas 37 is a prime number.   
 For this study, participants of one or another SVO type were placed into one or 
another kind of position in the structure.  Because of behavioral similarities described in 
Chapter 1, individualists and competitors were collapsed into a single type, the proself 
(De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Simpson 2004; Simpson and Willer 2008).  Thus there 
are two SVO types to allocate.  For the dyad, where there are two identical positions, I 
studied all three pairings: “pure types,” proself – proself pairs and prosocial - prosocial 
pairs, and “the mixed type” proself – prosocial pairs.  For the Br31 and the 4-Line there 
are two types of positions and thus four types of “pure” and “mixed” pairings for each, all 
of which are investigated.  
 
Dyads 
Dyads are equal power structures in that neither position is advantaged.  The two 
positions are identical in terms of connection, as neither has a structural basis of power.  
Because dyadic positions are equal power, completed exchanges result in equal division 
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of resources unless pairs of participants carry different conditions with them into the 
exchange that affect results (Willer 1999).   
 
Hypotheses 
Embedding identical SVO types into the Resistance equation for the dyad produces a 
prediction of equal resource divisions.  I expect proselfs, however, to earn more than half 
of the resource pool when paired with prosocials.  The Resistance equation solution for 
this pairing is a 25.25 payoff for the proself and 11.75 points for the prosocial.  This 
follows previous SVO literature which suggests that prosocials can be subject to 
exploitation by proselfs. 
H1: Identical dyadic pairs will exchange at equal power, with each actor 
receiving 18.5 points on average. 




Table 2.2 provides the average earnings in the three types of dyads studied here.  As 
shown, participants in all dyads earned average payoffs nearly identical to equal power 
payoffs.  Hypothesis 1 was thus supported.  The observed mean for prosocial pairs was 
18.72 (n= 10, SD= 0.74), which was not significantly different from the expected mean 
of 18.5 (p= 0.37, t= 0.94).  Proself pairs earned an average payoff of 18.86 (n= 10, SD= 
1.39); this observed mean was also not statistically different from the expected 18.5 (p= 
0.43, t= 0.83).  
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Table 2.2 Average Earnings for the A Position in the Dyad. 
CONFIGURATION 
A – B 
M N 
P – P 18.72 (0.74) 
 
10 
P – I 18.56 (2.08) 
 
21 








*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
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 Hypothesis 2 expects SVO effects to alter conditions within the dyad by 
introducing power differences into a network with no structural means for power 
exercise; this hypothesis was not supported.  The observed mean of 18.56 for prosocials 
when paired with proselfs (n= 21, SD= 2.08) was significantly different from the 
predicted 11.75 payoff (p< 0.0001, t= 15.00), but is not different from the equal power 
payoff (p= 0.89, t= 0.13).    
 SVO effects were absent in the dyad.  Equal exchange means were found across 
all SVO combinations; this finding stands in contrast to the metric prediction for mixed 
pairs and numerous SVO studies which have found differences between SVO types.  A 
possible explanation is that prosocials were not willing to succumb to the demands of 
proselfs and be exploited, but instead sought equality.  Alternatively, it could be argued 
that the equal power structure overwhelmed the social value differences.  Such 





The Br31 is a strong power structure because it has two types of positions: the central 
position which can never be excluded, and the three peripherals, two of which will be 
excluded.  The risk of exclusion drives competition between these positions to push  
resource divisions to the extreme as peripherals make increasingly favorable offers to the 
central – as observed in all previous research.  (Willer 1999).  
 
 
                                                             
11 Further analyses of interaction processes, including first offers and timing of negotiations, are discussed 




Prosocial orientation suggests that, when central, prosocials should seek to complete 
exchanges with equal payoffs.  That is to say, a prosocial occupying the central position 
should resist the temptation to exploit the peripherals.  Proselfs are not subject to this 
concern for equity, and should behave in a manner consistent with previous NET 
findings, seeking only to maximize their own payoffs.
12
 
H3: Prosocial centrals should receive an average payoff of 18.5. 




I examined the following four structural configurations: 1) pure prosocial (prosocial 
central with all prosocial peripherals), 2) a prosocial central with all proself peripherals, 
3) pure proself, and 4) a proself central with all prosocial peripherals.  Because of my 
interest in the payoffs and actions of centrals, I focused on comparing configurations 1 
and 2 to configurations 3 and 4.  Table 2.3 reports the average earnings of centrals. 
 Prosocials earned an average of 25.01 points when occupying the central position 
(n=20, SD= 5.09).  Hypothesis 3 predicted an average payoff 18.5 points for prosocial 
centrals.  To test this hypothesis, a one-sample t-test showed a significant difference 
between the observed and expected means (p < 0.0001, t= 5.72).  This finding does not  
  
                                                             
12 It should be noted that power develops in strong power exchange structures through the actions of 
peripherals competing for exchange with the central, which should suggest that the peripheral’s action is 
more important than the action of the central.  Nevertheless, my interest in the central position stems from 
an argument made by Willer et al.  As they suggest (2013:124), prosocial centrals may be more active as 
they seek out equal divisions to “impose equality” in the structure (italics removed). 
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Table 2.3 Br31 Average Earnings for Central Positions. 
POSITION MEAN N 
P Central 25.01 (5.09) 
 
20 
With P Peripherals 24.57 (5.45) 
 
10 
With I Peripherals 25.44 (4.95) 
 
10 
I Central 27.69 (4.49) 
 
14 
With P Peripherals 28.08 (4.91) 
 
11 












support Hypothesis 3.  As a follow-up test, I conducted a t-test to compare the prosocial 
centrals’ observed mean to the observed mean of 27.69 points for proself centrals       
 (n= 14, SD= 4.49).  This difference was not statistically significant (p= 0.12, t= 1.59).  
Hypothesis 4 expected proself centrals to earn significantly more than an equal share of a 
resource pool.  To test Hypothesis 4, I conducted a one-sample t-test to compare the 
observed proself central mean to 18.5 points, the expected prosocial payoff.  A significant 
difference (p< 0.0001, t= 7.66) supported this hypothesis. 
 Taken together, these findings do not support hypothesized SVO effects.  Proself 
power exercises are predicted by NET for strong power structures.  Equally strong power 
exercised by prosocial centrals, however, is a departure from predictions based on 
resistance calculations and expectations formed from previous SVO research.  As in the 
dyad, expected SVO effects were not found.  Both prosocials and proselfs occupying the 
central position engaged in exploitation. 
 
4-Line Structures 
The 4-Line is a weak power structure.  The central B positions are never excluded from 
exchange.  The actors in these B positions can exchange with each other, or with the 
actors occupying the peripheral positions. The peripheral A positions are excluded if the 
Bs exchange with each other.  Because of these possibilities, resource divisions in the 4-
Line fall between equal divisions of equal power structures and extreme splits of strong 






I placed participants in the 4-Line with differing SVOs in the following configurations: 1) 
pure prosocial (prosocials occupying A and B positions), 2) prosocial central Bs with 
proself peripherals, 3) pure proself and 4) proself central Bs with prosocial peripherals.  
Because the initial metric predictions for the 4-Line distinguished individualists and 
competitors, I adjusted these to new predictions for the proself category. Following much 
of the SVO literature and the metric predictions, I expect prosocials to be exploited by 
proselfs, regardless of their position in the 4-Line, as shown in Hypotheses 6 and 7 
below. 
H5: Centrals in pure structures (configurations 1 and 3) should earn an average 
payoff that is slightly more favorable than an equal division.  Prosocial centrals 
should receive an average payoff of 19.66, and proself centrals should earn an 
average payoff of 20.94. 
H6: When proselfs occupy the central B positions and prosocials occupy the 
peripheral A positions (configuration 4), proself centrals should receive an 
average payoff of 27.56. 
H7: When prosocials occupy the central B positions and proselfs occupy the 
peripheral A positions (configuration 2), prosocial centrals should receive an 
average payoff of 12.14. 
 
Results 
For each experimental run, I combined the mean payoffs for both central Bs into one 
overall mean payoff. That is to say, I averaged payoffs across the two A – B relations of 
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the 4-Line.  Table 2.4 presents the average earnings for the B positions in each 
configuration. 
 The findings partially support my predictions for the 4-Line structures.  The 
predictions for the pure structures in Hypothesis 5 were partially supported.  Prosocial Bs 
in configuration 1 earned a mean payoff of 17.95 (n= 8, SD= 2.17); this mean was not 
significantly different from the expected value of 19.66 (p= 0.06, t= 2.23).
13
  
Nevertheless, a p value of 0.06 is worth noting.  While this is not technically significant 
by the arbitrary standard p value of 0.05, it is on the cusp of significance.  This difference 
between the observed and expected means for pure prosocial 4-Line could be argued as a 
real and important difference.  It is possible that with a larger cell size, this would 
become a statistically significant finding.   
 For mixed 4-Line structures, neither Hypothesis 6 nor Hypothesis 7 was 
supported.  The findings were not consistent with the predicted payoffs.  Looking first at 
Hypothesis 6, proself centrals in configuration 4 were expected to exercise power over 
prosocial peripherals and benefit at their expense.  The observed mean of 19.69 for 
proself centrals in these structures (n= 11, SD= 1.18) was significantly different (p< 
0.0001, t= 22.12) from the predicted payoff of 27.56.  Hypothesis 7 also suggested that 
proselfs, even when occupying the peripheral positions, would benefit at the expense of  
prosocials.  Said differently, prosocial centrals were expected to be exploited by proself 
peripherals.  This expectation was not supported.  The observed mean of  
18.91 (n= 11, SD= 1.15) for prosocial Bs in configuration 2 was significantly different 
(p< 0.0001, t= 19.52) from the expected value of 12.14 points.   
                                                             
13 Proself centrals in the pure proself structures earned a mean payoff of 19.68 points (SD= 1.19), compared 
to an expected mean of 20.94.  Because of a low n for this configuration (n= 4), a t-test was not conducted. 
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Table 2.4 Average Earnings for Central B Positions in the 4-Line. 
 
CONFIGURATION 
A – B – B – A 
MEAN N 
P – P – P – P 
 
17.95 (2.17) 8 
I – P – P – I 
 
18.91 (1.15) 11 
P – I – I – P 
 
19.69 (1.18) 11 
I – I – I – I 
 







*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
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 Despite the correspondence between the prediction for pure prosocial 4-Line 
structures in Hypothesis 5 and the results, the overall findings are more consistent with 
those in the previous structures.  The means of all four SVO configurations were near 19 
points; the central positions earned similar payoffs, in comparison to the power exercise 
expected from the initial predictions in Hypotheses 6 and 7.  Evidence of SVO effects in 
these exchange networks rarely, if ever, occurred.  Of the three types of exchange 
networks studied here, only the prosocial 4-Line structures revealed potential SVO 
effects in that the prosocial centrals did not exercise power over the prosocial peripherals. 
 
Interaction Processes 
In addition to investigating exchange payoffs, I also looked for possible differences in the 
negotiation processes within structures.  A focus on exchange means alone looks past the 
series of offers and counteroffers preceding the completed exchange.  Analyses of 
resource divisions at agreement ignore the negotiation process leading up to the 
completed exchange.  For example, in dyads, if prosocials are seeking equality, they will 
reach agreement with each other more quickly than do proselfs whose motives are mixed.   
 To check for negotiation differences between SVOs, I first compared ‘actions’.  
ExNet records all offers and completed exchanges; each offer, counteroffer and 
agreement is recorded as a separate ‘action’.  To compare configurations within each 
structure type, I counted the number of actions per experimental session and calculated 
means for each group.  I will report these results for the dyad and 4-Line
14
.  Additionally, 
I compared the timing of rounds and examined first offers in the dyad.  Below, I will first 
                                                             
14 The Br31 was not included in the analyses of interaction processes because of an interest in negotiations 
in equal and weak power networks rather than strong power.  
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review the action comparisons within the dyads and 4-Lines, and then discuss the 
supplementary tests of first offers and time to complete an exchange in the dyads. 
 
Dyads 
No differences in resource divisions between SVO combination types have been found.  
Nevertheless, differences in the negotiation process are also predicted.  Prosocials should 
more quickly agree to exchange with less bargaining than proselfs.  
H6: The number of actions in the negotiation process ranked from small to large 
is predicted to be: prosocial-prosocial, prosocial-proself, and proself-proself. 
 Paired prosocials had the fewest actions (M=145, n=11, SD= 69.14).  Prosocial-
proself dyads averaged 167 actions (n=26, SD= 60.41).  Proself-proself dyads had the 
highest number of actions, with a mean of 186 actions (n=12, SD= 102.33).  A 
comparison of the two types of pure structures was not significant (p= 0.28, t= 1.09).  
Neither the actions in the pure prosocial structures (p= 0.36, t= 0.92) nor the actions in 
the pure proself structures (p= 0.47, t= 0.72) were different from the actions in the mixed 
structures.  These results are not strong enough to support Hypothesis 6.  While the 
observed means are in the predicted direction, there were no significant differences.
15
  
These findings do, however, underscore the fact that predicted SVO differences either do 
not occur or are, at best, only weakly present.   
 
4-Lines 
Assuming SVO effects, I predicted results similar to those predicted for the dyad.  Pure 
prosocial 4-Lines (prosocials occupying all A and B positions) should have the fewest 
                                                             
15 It is important to note that this could be due to large standard deviations or the relatively small cell sizes. 
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negotiations, while pure proself 4-Lines (proselfs occupying all A and B positions) 
should have the most.   
H7: I predict the following order for the negotiation process: pure prosocial 4-
Lines should have the fewest negotiations, followed by prosocial centrals with 
proself peripherals and proself centrals with prosocial peripherals, and pure 
proself 4-Lines should have the most negotiations. 
  Pure prosocial 4-Lines had the fewest number of actions with a mean of 241.5 (n= 
8, SD= 77.99).  Pure proself 4-Lines had the next fewest number of actions with a mean 
of 315.75 (n=4, SD= 105.93).  This was followed by 336.54 actions on average for 
prosocial centrals with proself peripherals (n= 11, SD= 131.40) and 426.54 actions on 
average for proself centrals with prosocial peripherals (n= 11, SD= 217.34). 
 The possible t-test comparisons revealed moderate support for Hypothesis 7.
16
  A 
t-test found a significant difference (p= 0.035, t= 2.29) between the mean actions for pure 
prosocial 4-Lines (the smallest mean) and the mean actions for proself centrals with 
prosocial peripherals (the largest mean).  The remaining comparisons were not 
statistically significant, yet are still worth noting because of important differences.  
Actions within pure prosocial 4-Lines were only different from actions in structures with 
prosocial centrals and proself peripherals (p= 0.08, t= 1.82).  The actions of structures 
with proself centrals with prosocial peripherals were not significantly different from 
those in structures with prosocial centrals with proself peripherals (p= 0.25, t= 1.17).  As 
an additional comparison, I grouped the four configurations into two types based on the 
SVOs of the centrals Bs.  Structures with prosocial centrals averaged 296.52 actions per 
                                                             




session (n= 19, SD= 119.50).  Structures with proself centrals averaged 397.00 actions 
per session (n= 15, SD= 196.77).  These means were marginally different in the predicted 
direction (p= 0.07, t= 1.84).   
 At first glance, these 4-Line results coupled with the dyad results suggest that I 
have found weak support for the presence of SVO effects.  Yet despite only one 
statistically significant finding, what these results reflect is that there were other notable 
differences worth discussing.  It is very likely that due to small cell sizes and large 
standard deviations, the differences in most of these comparisons were weakened.  For 
example, proself centrals averaged almost 50% more actions than did prosocials.  While 
the p value of this t-test was not within the range of statistical significance, I would argue 
that this is a real effect, as it is very close to 0.05.  Simply ignoring p values of 0.07 and 
0.08 would lead to overlooking notable findings.  At this point, it would be premature to 
conclude that there is clear evidence of no differences in negotiation processes.  A lack of 
statistical power is likely to have led to these findings, rather than an absence of different 
negotiation behaviors. 
  
Supplemental Dyad Analyses: Timing and First Offers 
Along with actions, ExNet records the time in seconds for each event within each round 
of exchange.  After finding no statistically significant differences between dyad 
configuration actions, I next looked at the average time in seconds for completed rounds 
of exchange.  Pure proself pairs averaged 61.7 seconds per completed round (n= 10, SD= 
38.20).  Pure prosocial pairs averaged 50.57 seconds (n= 10, SD= 37.70), and mixed 
pairs completed exchange at an average of 66.4 seconds (n=21, SD= 31.95).   
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 I conducted the three possible t-tests, finding no significant differences in timing.  
Time to complete rounds in prosocial pairs was neither significantly different from time 
in proself pairs (p= 0.52, t= 0.66) nor from time to complete rounds in mixed pairs (p= 
0.23, t= 1.22).  Proself pairs and mixed pairs were also not significantly different in time 
to complete rounds (p= 0.72, t= 0.35). 
 To further explore potential timing differences between dyad configurations, I 
compared blocks of exchange rounds.  I used the first five rounds of exchange and the 
last five rounds of exchange to examine how the timing of negotiation processes might 
differ over the course of experimental sessions.  For example, do rounds of exchange 
reach completion faster over time?  Which type(s) of dyads negotiated for the longest 
period of time?   
 In pure prosocial, pure proself, and mixed dyads, the average time to complete a 
round of exchange decreased between the first five rounds and the last five rounds.  
Prosocial pairs showed the largest time difference between first (M= 72.64 seconds, n= 
10, SD= 55.68) and last rounds (M= 44.66 seconds, SD= 34.29).  This difference in 
average time in seconds between the first five and last five rounds was significant (p= 
0.02, t= 2.76).  Neither of the other dyad configurations showed a significant difference 
in timing of negotiations between the first and last rounds.  Proself pairs averaged 76.88 
seconds (n= 10, SD= 37.79) per round during the first five rounds and 63.18 seconds 
(SD= 49.03) during the last five rounds (p= 0.4, t= 0.84).  Mixed pairs averaged 68.22 
seconds (n= 21, SD= 38.44) during the first five rounds and 58.85 seconds (SD= 35.87) 
during the last five rounds (p= 0.43, t= 0.80).  Comparisons between dyad configurations 
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 Overall, these tests of timing revealed almost no significant findings within the 
negotiation process between prosocials and proselfs.  Nevertheless, these results suggest 
some differences in negotiation.  Prosocial pairs showed a significant difference in the 
time to complete rounds of exchange between the first and last rounds.  This finding 
perhaps suggests that, at least in terms of timing, prosocials negotiated with each other 
differently than did proselfs. 
 To analyze the first offer in each round of exchange, I noted the SVO of the 
participant making the offer and the points s/he wished to earn in the proposed offer.  I 
compared all prosocials’ offers to all proselfs’ offers across the three types of dyads.  
When making a first offer to their exchange partners, prosocials proposed to keep a mean 
of 20.43 out of 37 points (n= 35, SD= 2.27).  When proselfs made the first offer, they 
proposed to keep 20.75 points out of 37 on average (n= 37, SD= 2.57).  A t-test found 
that this difference was not significant (p= 0.57, t= 0.57).   
 Within the mixed pair dyads, I also compared how often prosocials and proselfs 
conceded (accepted the partner’s offer and completed the round of exchange).  Prosocials 
accepted their partners’ offers in 52% of the rounds, while proselfs accepted their 
partners’ offers in 48% of the rounds; this difference was not significant (p= 0.47, t= 
0.72). 
                                                             
17 The average time per round during the first five rounds within prosocial pairs was not significantly 
different from that of proself pairs (p= 0.84, t= 0.20) or from that of mixed pairs (p=0.80, t= 0.25).  Proself 
pairs and mixed pairs were also similar during the first five rounds (p= 0.56, t= 0.59).  The average time per 
round during the last five rounds within prosocial pairs was not significantly different from that of proself 
pairs (p= 0.34, t= 0.98) or mixed pairs (p= 0.30, t= 1.04).  Proself pairs and mixed pairs were also not 





Because of varying times between the completion of the Nine Item Social Value 
Inventory and the lab portion of the study, as the research progressed, a one-shot Dictator 
Game was introduced during two parts in the study.  Along with the Nine Item Social 
Value Inventory measure, the Dictator Game has been used as a standard indicator of 
SVO (Fisman et al. 2007; Simpson and R. Willer 2008).  The Dictator Game was 
administered just prior to the tutorial as an additional SVO measure (n=79).  A post-test 
one-shot Dictator Game was added to check for potential effects of the exchange game on 
orientation, such as orientation drift (n=333).  I also administered the Dictator Game to 
participants who were scored by the Nine Item Social Value Inventory but did not 
participate in the exchange portion of the study (n=94).  This was done as a check for 
experimental effects on SVO.   
 In the Dictator Game, a player is given an endowment of resources and is asked to 
decide how these resources should be divided (if at all) with another person. The 
recipient is passive and has no role in the decision.  In this experiment, each participant 
played a paper-and-pencil one-shot game.  The directions informed each participant that 
s/he had been given 37 points, and these points could be kept or shared with another 
person in the study.  The giver could choose any amount between 0 and 37 to give, and 
the recipient would never know the identity of the giver.  Each person would then be paid 
based on the number of points earned in the game.  These directions were the same for all 






I performed a Pearson correlation test on the results of participants who completed both 
the pre-test and post-test games (n= 79).  There was a correlation (r= 0.77) between 
points given in the pre-test and points given in the post-test, which suggests that 
participants’ pre-experiment SVOs were not altered after the exchange game.  In the post-
experiment Dictator Game, prosocials gave an average of 14.06 points out of 37 to an 
ostensible partner (n= 187, SD= 8.47).  Proselfs gave an average of 9.18 points out of 37 
(n= 146, SD= 9.47).  This difference in points given away by prosocials and proselfs was 
statistically significant (p < 0.0001, t= 4.95).  The difference between points given by 
prosocials in the non-experiment Dictator game (M= 15.89, n= 46, SD= 7.12) and points 
given by proselfs in the non-experiment game (M= 9.71, n= 48, SD= 9.52) was also 
significant (p= 0.0006, t= 3.55).   
 I found no differences within SVO type across these conditions.  The mean 
number of points given away by prosocials in the experiment and the mean number given 
away by prosocials not in the experiment were not significantly different (p= 0.2, t= 
1.35).  Similarly, the mean number of points given away by proselfs was not significantly 
different between post-experiment and non-experiment conditions (p= 0.73, t= 0.33).  
Regardless of pre-, post-, or non-experiment conditions, prosocials gave similarly, 
proselfs gave similarly, and prosocials were more generous to their ostensible recipients 






The results from the three types of exchange structures in Study 1, along with the 
supplementary analyses described above, reveal an absence of significant SVO effects in 
exchange networks.  The end results of negotiation, points earned in completed exchange, 
were indistinguishable between prosocials and proselfs.  Both SVO types earned 
similarly in the dyad, Br31, and 4-Line structures.  Moderate SVO effects were only 
found in the pure prosocial 4-Line; other hypotheses that predicted SVO effects were not 
supported. 
 Yet the examination of interaction processes suggested that there were some 
substantive differences between SVO types.  While only sometimes statistically 
significant, these trends in the results revealed that prosocials required fewer actions to 
reach agreement in the 4-Line and were able to do so at a faster rate over time in dyads, 
as compared to paired proselfs and mixed pairs.  What can be said at this point about 
these initial results in exchange rates and negotiation processes?   
 The exchange rates in the three structures currently provide the stronger set of 
evidence; despite some trends in the negotiation process, SVO effects were generally 
absent in the completed exchange rates.  Regardless of how participants arrived at their 
agreements, their payoffs in all structures, except for the prosocial 4-Line, were 
indistinguishable from previous NET predictions that did not embed SVO factors.  While 
my primary goal in this study was to focus on an examination of exchange outcomes 
rather than the processes leading up to completed exchanges, future work can return to 
the investigation of negotiations. 
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 Nevertheless, these findings do not threaten the validity of previous SVO or NET 
research.  Both research programs have a substantial history of repeated support for 
predicted outcomes in research.  What my findings instead suggest is that there is a social 
structural effect (or multiple effects) which dampen SVO effects.  What is most 
interesting about the lack of SVO effects is the action of prosocials.  Proself actions 
corresponded with the expectations of SVO literature and normal NET conditions. Yet 
why did the behavior of prosocial participants in most structures converge with the 
behavior of proselfs?  Perhaps the conditions in these exchange networks were too 
limiting for prosocials to signal and act on cooperative motivations. Yet that suggestion 
seems doubtful. Certainly when prosocials negotiated with prosocials, there were many 
opportunities to signal prosociality including making more cooperative first offers and 
making concessions more readily.   In the next chapter, I introduce a second study which 




SOCIAL VALUES AND COALITION FORMATION IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS: 
STUDY TWO 
As shown in the previous chapter, the experiments of Study 1 produced findings which 
revealed more similarities than differences between participants of differing SVOs.  
When placed in exchange structures, both prosocials and proselfs exchanged and 
exploited (when possible) in a similar manner.  The majority of exchange results in the 
previous chapter corresponded to those of previous NET experiments in which an 
individualist orientation was encouraged and did not correspond to SVO findings 
reported in the literature or to the new resistance-based predictions discussed earlier in 
the chapter.  
The dissertation research now turns to opportunities for collective action.  
Forming coalitions is a cooperative and collective task, one that should be more readily 
taken up by prosocials than by proselfs.  If we are to find differences between prosocials 
and proselfs, it should be in their proclivity toward collective action.   
 A second study allowing coalition formation among low power actors was 
conducted to test for differences between prosocials and proselfs.  Perhaps prosocials did 
not have the opportunity to signal cooperative intentions in the previous exchange 
experiments. If so, will SVO effects present themselves when the power conditions of 
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exchange structures are countered by the availability of a cooperation choice? If SVO 
effects are observed it will show that prosocials are more collectively oriented than 
proselfs in at least one exchange setting.   
In this chapter, I will review previous research on collective action from both the 
exchange literature and the SVO literature.  Then, I will discuss the methods and results 
of Study 2, which tested differences between prosocials and proselfs within exchange 
structures that allowed for coalition formation.  Experimental conditions of the exchange 
structure and coalition formation replicated those of Simpson and Macy (2001).   
 
Coalitions and Cooperation in Exchange and SVO Settings 
In the hope of finding stronger SVO effects in exchange structures, interest has turned to 
structures in which actors can countervail power by acting collectively.   Previous NET 
studies have investigated coalition formation within exchange structures (Simpson and 
Macy 2001, 2004; Simpson and Willer 2005; Borch and Willer 2006).  A primary goal of 
these studies was to investigate how and when low power actors will form coalitions to 
countervail the power of a central actor.   
 Simpson and Macy (2001) found that low power actors who were able to 
countervail power, and complete coalitions (coalition formation by all low power actors 
in a network) could potentially reverse the power difference.  In a later study, the authors 
investigated the relationship between cooperation levels in coalition formation and social 
identity (2004). Simpson and Willer (2005) investigated coalition formation in networks 
with differing power conditions.  Borch and Willer (2006) examined the games 
embedded within exchange structures, and found that certain coalition conditions could 
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transform the game played by low power actors from a Prisoner’s Dilemma to the 
Privileged Game. All found that coalitions countervailed power to some degree.  
 Allowing actors in peripheral positions to act collectively against a powerful, 
central actor has the potential to reduce inequalities in exchange.  According to Simpson 
and Macy (2001), most NET experiments only allow communication related to 
negotiation of offers.  Furthermore,  
the inability to communicate outside an exchange relation precludes 
coordination of offers by low-power actors who may be competing to 
exchange with a common partner but are unable to exchange with one 
another.  Without the option of collusion, structurally disadvantaged actors 
must accept inferior allocations or risk exclusion from exchange 
(2001:89). 
Following this argument, prosocials in Study 1 may have defaulted to competitive 
behavior because they had no means of signaling cooperative intentions. 
SVO research proposes differences in preferences and behavior in collective 
orientation.  Prosocials are more cooperative and more willing to share in the Dictator 
and Public Goods games (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange 
and Visser 1999; Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits 2007).  Another study suggested a 
projection effect when asking participants to guess the orientations of ostensible partners.  
The researchers found that participants expected others to share their orientation (Iedema 
and Poppe 1994).  For instance, more prosocials expected others to be prosocials, than 
did proselfs.  Proselfs more frequently expected others to be proself than did prosocials.   
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In general, the prosocial orientation type has been found to be associated with 
higher rates of cooperation, concern for others’ outcomes, and collective motivation (De 
Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Bogaert et al. 2008).  Prosocials feel a much greater sense of 
social responsibility, which is thought to be why they contribute more often than do 
proselfs and improve the collective interest in games (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001).  
In Study 1 of their 2001 research, De Cremer and Van Lange found that prosocials 
contributed at higher rates in a Public Goods dilemma and reported a greater sense of 
duty to benefit the group.  Those who are identified as prosocial express a greater 
willingness to act cooperatively (Van Dijk, De Cremer, and Handgraaf 2004). 
 
STUDY 2: ARE PROSOCIALS MORE COLLECTIVELY ORIENTED IN 
FORMING AND ACTING IN COALITIONS THAN PROSELFS? 
In this section, I will describe the methods of the study.  This study consisted of two 
experimental portions.  First, the orientations of the participants were measured.  Next, 
those that could be assigned one of the three orientation types interacted in a two-part 
exchange structure which replicated the structure and design used in Simpson and Macy’s 
coalition study (2001).  Figure 3.1 displays the network in which they interacted.  After 
describing the methods, I will offer hypotheses and report results of the experiment. 
 
Methods 
Participants were college undergraduates enrolled at a large state university.  The first 
step was to determine orientation type by administering an online survey.  As in Study 1, 
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Figure 3.1 Study 2 Coalition Networks.  
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(McClintock et al. 1973; Van Lange 1999).  Following the previous study, I collapsed 
individualists and competitors into the proself category (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; 
Simpson 2004; Simpson and R. Willer 2008).  Those who consistently answered 7 out of 
9 items were then contacted for the lab portion of the study.   
 In the lab, the initial experimental setup was identical to Study 1.  Participants 
were placed in individual rooms, read experimental instructions that they should 
“Negotiate as you see fit,” and completed the ExNet computer tutorial.  After 
individually completing the tutorial, participants began the interactive exchange portion.   
 The Br32 structure was used in the two-part exchange game in the lab.  This 
power structure, shown in Figure 3.1, has one central position connected to three 
peripheral positions, which have no other connections.  In each round, the central actor 
can complete only 2 of the 3 possible exchanges, meaning that at least one peripheral can 
be excluded per round.  Each relation held a resource pool of 24 points. 
 Since the actions of the participants in the peripheral positions, rather than the 
central, are of interest in this study, following Simpson and Macy (2001, 2004), the 
central position of the Br32 was simulated in both parts.  This simulation was a 
parametrically rational actor similar to those used in other NET research (Willer and 
Skvoretz 1997; Simpson and Macy 2001).  A simulated central actor ensured that 
exclusion would occur in each round to the subject making the lowest offer.  The 
simulated central actor “accepted the best offer and chose randomly among tied offers” 
(Simpson and Macy 2001:95).  Furthermore, the actor did “not simply accept the first 
offer made” because it “was not activated at the beginning of each negotiation period but 
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only after a brief time period” (Willer and Skvoretz 1997:22).  No participant expressed 
suspicion of the simulation. 
 
Practice Exchange Structure (No Coalition) 
The first exchange structure was designed to be a practice session for participants to 
familiarize themselves with ExNet before engaging in the coalition action.  This practice 
session consisted of 6 rounds of exchange, with one peripheral excluded per round.  
Participants knew they would engage in several rounds of exchange, but did not know the 
exact number.  Another benefit of this strong power structure as a practice session was to 
introduce participants to exclusion.  Presumed negative reactions to exclusion from 
exchange were expected to make the benefits of coalition formation more salient 
(Simpson and Macy 2004).  
 I examined this precoalition data to check for similar rates of exposure to 
exploitation among the peripheral positions.  Said differently, there was an interest in 
how power developed in prosocial and proself sessions.  If prosocial and proself sessions 
experienced different exchange rates, then they might have acted differently according to 
differing perceptions regarding the need to countervail power.  The peripherals in 
prosocial sessions earned a mean of 9.63 points out of 24 (n= 7, SD= 1.74).  The 
peripherals in proself sessions earned a mean of 8.71 points (n= 8, SD= 1.95).  A t-test 
revealed that this was not a significant difference in earnings during the non-coalition 
phase (p= 0.36, t= 0.93).  Importantly, prosocial and proself sessions experienced similar 
rates of power development; thus, one group should not have been potentially more 
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motivated than the other to form coalitions based on differing conditions in the first phase 
of the experiment. 
 In this phase of the study and the one to follow, participants viewed their own and 
all other’s offers and agreements.  After completion of the 6 practice rounds, participants 
remained in their positions and began a new set of rounds in the Br32 structure. 
 
Exchange Structure with Coalition Option 
Participants next completed 12 rounds of exchange with the option of joining a coalition.  
Instructions and an explanation of coalition formation were provided on each computer 
screen through ExNet.  Participants read the details of this portion individually, and then 
began negotiations when all were ready (signaled by clicking a “Ready” button).  For this 
structure, a minimum of 2 out of the 3 peripherals were required to join the coalition for 
successful formation.   
 After the introductory information, the process of these exchange rounds was as 
follows: before each round, participants were asked if they wished to join a coalition.  If 
there was successful formation, the members of the coalition were prompted to vote on a 
group offer to send to the central.  These votes were then averaged to create the displayed 
group offer.  Coalition members were not prevented from straying from this group offer.  
They were notified that all points earned by coalition members would be distributed 
equally among the members.  Participants not in the coalition interacted with the central 
individually and retained any individually earned points.  When the coalition did not 




 Upon conclusion of the exchange sessions, all participants were given a post-
experiment questionnaire.  The questionnaire assessed relative satisfaction with the 
participants’ earned points and negotiations, as well as how often they joined coalitions 
and the perceived success of such actions.  They were then paid by points earned and 
their questions about the research were answered. 
 
Hypotheses 
Experimental sessions were grouped by orientation type.  Each session consisted of all 
prosocial participants or all proself participants.  Consistent with the SVO literature, I 
expected significant differences between prosocial and proself groups.  Because of their 
inclination toward collective orientation and cooperation, prosocials should be more 
willing than proselfs to engage in coalition formation.  The prosocials’ sense of social 
responsibility and concern for others’ outcomes enhance this likelihood.   
 Furthermore, prosocials may be more likely to form coalitions because of the 
projection argument presented earlier.  Prosocials will expect others to share their 
preferences, here meaning a desire to cooperate and act collectively.  The likelihood of 
forming a successful coalition with other assumed prosocials may increase the motivation 
to join in the initial action.  Proselfs, by contrast, should expect others in the group to 
hold more individualistic motivations.  If so, they would prefer to free ride, exchanging 
on their own.  
 H1: Prosocial peripherals will form coalitions more often than will proself 
peripherals.   
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 Additionally, prosocial coalitions should be more successful, here meaning earn 
higher average payoffs out of a 24 point resource pool, than proself coalitions.  Prosocials 
should be oriented toward offers and exchanges which are fair to all and trend away from 
exploitative exchange rates.  They should earn more within coalitions than their proself 
counterparts because they are expected to have less interest in competition for exchange. 
H2: Prosocial coalitions will earn higher average payoffs (be more successful) 
than proself coalitions. 
 
Results 
To test Hypothesis 1, the number of rounds out of 12 in which coalitions were formed 
was examined.  The hypothesis was not supported; prosocials did not engage in coalition 
formation any more frequently than did proselfs.  A t-test revealed that the mean number 
of coalitions for the prosocial sessions (M= 7.28, n= 7, SD= 3.45) was not significantly 
different (p=0.64, t= 0.47) from the mean number of coalitions in the proself sessions 
(M= 6.38, n= 8, SD= 3.81). 
 Hypothesis 2 was also not supported.  To test this hypothesis, the average payoff 
for prosocial coalition members was compared to the average payoff of proself coalition 
members.  Rounds without successful coalition formation were not included in this 
analysis.  The average earnings of prosocial coalition members (M= 7.19, n= 7, SD= 
2.64) were not significantly different (p= 0.37, t= 0.91) from the average earnings of 
proself coalition members (M= 6.41, n= 8, SD= 1.78).  Prosocial coalitions were no more 
effective in countervailing the power of the central actor than were proself coalitions. 
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 Due to the lack of support for both hypotheses, I conducted additional 
comparisons using t-tests to check for other possible differences.  Following Hypothesis 
1, I compared how often out of a possible 12 rounds each experimental session formed a 
complete coalition of 3 members.  While prosocials and proselfs did not statistically 
differ in how often they formed coalitions, perhaps they would differ in how often they 
formed complete coalitions of 3 members.  The difference between the average number 
of complete coalitions formed by prosocials (M= 1.57, n= 7, SD= 1.71) and the average 
number of complete coalitions formed by proselfs (M= 2.87, n= 8, SD= 3.35) was not 
significant (p= 0.37, t= 0.92).  The mean number of complete coalitions for proself 
sessions was almost double that of prosocial sessions.  It is possible that with a larger 
number of sessions or smaller standard deviations, this difference would be significant. 
For now, this result suggests that there was not a significant difference in how often 
prosocials and proselfs formed complete coalitions. 
 A second supplemental comparison followed Hypothesis 2 in that it examined 
potential differences in earnings.  Because I only compared the earnings of coalition 
members in my test of Hypothesis 2, I next compared the earnings of prosocial and 
proself free riders when coalitions of only 2 members were formed.  I expected proself 
free riders to be more successful than prosocial free riders, earning more points on 
average.  This expectation was not, however, supported by the results of the t-test.  In 
fact, prosocial free riders earned more points on average (M= 10.91, n= 33, SD= 4.79) 
than did proselfs (M= 8.07, n= 27, SD= 3.79).  The average earning of prosocial free 
riders was significantly different from (p = 0.01, t= 2.50) and larger than the average 
earnings of proself free riders. 
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 One prosocial session stood out as a potential outlier with higher free rider 
earnings than other sessions.  Because of this, I conducted another t-test with this session 
removed from the analysis.  After removal of the outlier session, prosocial free riders 
earned an average of 9.48 points (n= 27, SD= 3.82).  A t-test showed that the difference 
between prosocial and proself earnings was no longer significant (p= 0.17, t= 1.36).  
Without this outlier group, there were no statistical differences found between prosocials 
and proselfs in this study.  This statement should be made somewhat cautiously, as the 
number of experimental sessions for prosocial and proself groups was quite small.  With 
larger cell sizes and smaller standard deviations, these current similarities could 
potentially become significant differences. 
 It should also be noted that this coalition study did not force participants to stay in 
coalitions, nor did it allow negative sanctioning of those who did not.  These conditions 
were not included in the study because they would not be an appropriate test of SVO 
effects.  Previous research has shown that negative sanctioning will lead most actors to 
tend toward cooperation (Komorita 1987; Yamagishi 1988).  The goal of this study was 




Previous SVO research has repeatedly found strong social value effects in games and 
social dilemmas.  Yet the research reported here utilizing a standard SVO measure and 
embedding orientation types in exchange networks is absent of such strong expected 
effects.  Of the hypotheses that predicted SVO effects in exchange rates, only that for the 
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prosocial 4-Line structures was modestly supported.  Moderate differences were found 
within the negotiation processes in dyads and 4-Lines; prosocials in 4-Lines required 
fewer actions to complete exchange, and prosocial dyads completely exchanged more 
quickly than other pairs over time.  While the findings in Study 2 did not offer 
statistically significant support of the hypotheses, this experiment made comparisons 
between groups with small cell sizes.  These results do not lead to criticism of either SVO 
research methods and findings or NET methods and findings, but instead suggest that 
perhaps the strong effects of contrasting SVOs do not extend to the social relations and 
social structures of the kind studied here.   
 The findings of Study 2 suggest that, while prosocials have demonstrated a 
preference for cooperation and collective action, there are structural conditions within 
which those preferences do not lead to activity.  Yet it was expected that prosocial 
proclivities would resurface when participants were offered the option of acting 
collectively in Study 2.  Coalitions provide the chance to signal trust and a desire to 
cooperate, both of which were absent in Study 1.  The inability of prosocials to 
communicate such desires may have prevented them from collective organization.  When 
given the chance to do so, why did prosocials not take this opportunity at a greater rate?  
When they did act collectively, why were they no better than proselfs at countervailing 
power?   
While prosocials and proselfs certainly differ in many circumstances, such as 
social dilemmas, I now have evidence from two experimental studies that their behaviors 
are more similar than previously anticipated in social relationships and social structures 
like those studied here. Furthermore, these experimental results provide supporting 
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evidence for the argument that SVO is flexible and can be dampened by structural 
conditions.   
Why do prosocials and proselfs act more similarly when placed in exchange 
structures, even those that provide opportunities for cooperation?  Chapter 4 will address 
two tentative explanations for why the behaviors of participants with different SVOs 
were so similar. An argument put forth by Bogaert, Boone, and Declerck (2008) to 
explain differences in SVO research will be extended to the discussion of behavior in 
exchange settings.  A major theme of this next chapter is the power of social structure to 




THE POWER OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR 
While the two previous chapters presented my research findings, this chapter follows by 
exploring why they occurred.  A goal in this chapter is, therefore, to offer two potential 
explanations for why the behaviors of different SVO actors can converge, rather than 
differ, in situations such as negotiated exchange.  Why is prosociality dampened or 
eliminated in social relations and social structures?  This is an exploratory analysis, but I 
will suggest that one of these arguments provides the more likely explanation.  In this 
chapter, I will also emphasize the importance of the rational actor model in conditions 
such as exchange, in which it is a more parsimonious and successful predictor of 
behavior as compared to predictions using multiple SVO types.   
 Multiple explanations have been put forward for why we repeatedly see strong 
differences between orientation types in other studies which typically utilize social 
dilemma scenarios (Liebrand 1986; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Simpson 2004; 
Bogaert et al. 2008).  These explanations were reviewed in Chapter 1.  The issue at hand 
in this chapter is to explain the absence of such differences in situations such as 
negotiated economic exchange.  Why did the behaviors of SVO actors converge, more 
often than contrast, in both Study 1 and Study 2?  More specifically, why did participants 
who were classified as prosocial so frequently act proselfishly during the exchange 
portions of the experimental sessions?
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 In this chapter, I will first offer two exploratory explanations for why the actions 
of prosocials and proselfs will collapse in social structures such as exchange.  My 
discussion will primarily focus on why prosocial actors can shift to proself behaviors 
which more closely follow the narrowly rational actor model.  The explanations to be 
reviewed are management overload for prosocials and the power of the situation or 
structure.  With the second explanation, I will review instances of behavioral 
convergence under certain situational conditions, such as one-shot versus repeated 
interactions.  Next, I will discuss the implications of my research findings for the role of 
the rational actor.  Additionally, I will provide potential future research directions.   
 
CONVERGING BEHAVIORS OF ACTORS WITH DIFFERING SVOS  
One contribution of this dissertation research is its use of economic exchange conditions.  
To my knowledge, prior experimental studies of SVO have not examined this type of 
negotiation.  This dissertation research offers experimental findings from a new setting.  
Not only was the experimental design of this dissertation research different from the 
majority if not all of SVO studies, but its results also departed from the common 
knowledge that actors with contrasting SVOs will frequently exhibit contrasting 
behaviors.  The exchange outcomes of proselfs and proselfs in Studies 1 and 2 more often 
converged rather than contrasted.  
 These unexpected results do not suggest, however, an experimental design flaw.  
The results do not lead to criticism of previous SVO research which should be seen as 
well founded.  Nor should previous NET research lead to doubts about these results, for 
they were found in an experimental setting that has been used countless times to test 
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exchange theories.  What factors can account for this disparity between this research and 
previous SVO research? 
Furthermore, why was the rational choice model typically produced by NET in 
the lab a more parsimonious and better predictor of behavior than the new formulations 
incorporating SVO?  All participants in both studies were given neutral instructions to act 
as they saw fit within exchange structures and in coalition formation.  All participants 
were tested with the Nine Item Social Value Inventory, a common assessment in SVO 
research.  In fact, this dissertation research used the more rigorous assessment of 7 out of 
9 responses, rather than the typical classification based on 6 consistent responses out of 9.  
Experimental participants were prescreened appropriately and also differed in their giving 
behavior in Dictator Games.  Only the behaviors within exchange structures overlapped, 
even when prosocials were offered a cooperative option in the coalition study.   
In the following subsections, I will first review the explanation put forth by 
Bogaert and colleagues (2008) for why prosocials act proselfishly under some conditions.  
Then, I will present two possible explanations for why prosocials might shift to proself 
actions in conditions such as negotiated exchange.  What I will argue is the most likely 
explanation of converging behaviors is that structural conditions determine rational 
behavior and overwhelm individual proclivities.  My dissertation research findings lend 
further support to previous arguments that social values can be dampened under certain 
situational conditions. 
 
Lack of Trust Signals 
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Following Bogaert et al. (2008), it appears that behavioral differences between 
orientation types are determined, at least partially, by situational conditions.  Prosocials 
are not naïve negotiators who are willing to share or give away resources to any 
exploitative partner.  The desire to avoid exploitation can dampen collectively oriented 
behavior when prosocials do not expect ostensible partners to share their prosociality.  
Prosociality can also be overridden by contextual information, such as availability or size 
of resources, or knowledge of partners’ characteristics.  While SVO literature suggests 
that prosocials seek equality with their partners, Bogaert et al. (2008) assert that 
prosocials are more willing to cooperate, or share, when there are signals of trust or 
trustworthiness.  Signals of trustworthiness include information which implies that the 
ostensible partner is honest or moral (De Bruin & Van Lange 1999; Smeesters et al. 
2003). 
In the case of exchange structures, particularly strong power structures, it 
becomes obvious that trust cues are absent, or weak at best.  Prosocial motives shift in 
strong power exchange networks and merge with those of proselfs because these are 
competitive structures.  The opportunity to develop trust among peripherals or with a 
central position does not exist.  Peripheral positions must outbid each other for exchange 
with the central, and the central’s task is to manage these offers.  A prosocial actor in 
either position does not have the opportunity to act prosocially or send meaningful 
signals of trust.   
This argument provides a valuable starting point in that it focuses on orientation 
drift among prosocials and acknowledges situational impacts on behavior.  It is, however, 
insufficient to account for behavioral convergence in exchange structures.  Study 2 
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provided a potential test of such an explanation.  Coalition formation should allow for 
trust and trustworthiness signals among peripheral positions, yet prosocial coalition 
formation was indistinguishable from proself coalition formation. Thus trust cannot 
explain all cases of prosocial becoming proself.   
The following subsections provide two potential explanations for behavioral 
convergence in structures such as exchange networks.  One of these explanations relies 
on the impact of situational factors on behaviors and choices.  The other explanation is an 
alternative approach which assumes that SVO effects are stable.  While I will argue for 
the power of structural effects over individual preferences, this alternative approach is 
testable, as I will explain below. 
 
Power of the Situation/Structure  
The first possible explanation for the convergence of behavior relies on situational 
effects.  I argue that this is the more likely explanation for behavioral convergence 
between prosocials and proselfs.  When prosocials and proselfs are placed in games, they 
have the opportunity to act on their individual preferences for how outcomes should 
affect self and other.  Yet when they are placed in social structures, such as exchange 
networks, the structural and situational conditions overwhelm individual differences.   
 Regardless of SVO, I expect individuals to act similarly when placed in social 
structures, based on the situational conditions present in the structures.  Structures 
provide a set of rational behaviors which actors, both prosocial and proself, can infer or 
learn and adjust accordingly.  Kinship or friendship structures suggest that, in order to 
benefit from these relations, it is rational to be prosocial and generous with our time and 
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resources.  An individual who normally shares with friends and family will alter his/her 
actions when entering a structure with conditions that suggest competition or self-serving 
behavior is rational.  For instance, within a bureaucracy, structural conditions such as 
competitive mobility suggest that it is rational to be obedient in order to benefit in the 
organization, here meaning to compete for promotion in the hierarchy (Weber [1918] 
1968).   
 In the case of my dissertation studies, the situational effects of economic 
exchange appear to override prosocial interest in fairness and equal joint outcomes.  The 
power of the structure has the potential to overwhelm some of these previously observed 
SVO effects.  The negotiation process of economic exchange prescribes the rationality of 
‘economic man,’ and both prosocials and proselfs sought to maximize resources. While 
participants were never encouraged to gain points, they were made aware that points 
earned were directly tied to money received at the end of the study.  The competitive and 
self-interested nature of gaining monetary resources might have led prosocials to behave 
in such a proself manner.  Even within the coalition study, prosocials appeared to be 
willing to free ride as often as proselfs did.  Awareness of competition with non-coalition 
participants or concern with reduction of earnings may have driven prosocials to offer 
more favorable payoffs even within coalitions.  
 
Decision-Making Processes 
A situational factor which can dampen SVO effects is the time element related to 
decision-making.  Individuals, especially proselfs, may respond differently in one-shot 
interactions versus repeated interactions.  In one-shot or single-trial interactions, 
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prosocials more often act cooperatively, compared to proselfs.  Prosocials are more likely 
than proselfs to cooperate with ostensible partners rather than exploit them, and to choose 
to reciprocate after a partner has made a cooperative decision (Kuhlman and Marshello 
1975; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994).  Prosocials exhibit a propensity to cooperate in 
most situations; the shadow of the future, though, can often motivate proselfs to shift 
from defection to more cooperative choices (Axelrod 1984; Van Lange et al. 2011).  This 
behavioral shift among proselfs is thought to occur because the anticipation of future or 
repeated interactions leads them to realize cooperation will earn greater benefits (Van 
Dijk et al. 2004; Van Lange et al. 2011). 
There are several examples of decision-making shifts (cooperate vs. defect) in 
repeated interaction situations within the SVO literature. Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) 
uncovered important similarities between prosocials and proselfs in repeated games.  
Participants played several rounds of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with an ostensible 
partner.  These partners were computer generated to follow a 100% cooperation strategy, 
100% defection strategy, or tit-for-tat strategy.  Both individualists and prosocials (here 
termed ‘cooperators’) cooperated more often with the tit-for-tat response partner, and 
cooperated much less often with the 100% defection response partner.  Learning and 
anticipating a partner’s choices in a repeated game thus sometimes shifted behavior away 
from the participants’ initially assessed values.  Van Lange and Visser (Van Lange 1999; 
Van Lange and Visser 1999) found similar results.  Cooperation levels of prosocials 





Management Overload for Prosocials 
An alternative explanation for the lack of differences between orientation types is what I 
will term ‘management overload’ in the case of prosocial actors.  Prosocials acting in 
exchange structures may not be able to manage two or more relations.  Their utility 
function depends on the joint outcome of self and one other, and a preference for 
minimizing the difference between self and the other.  While they can manage the 
decisions found in previous SVO experiments and decisions in dyads, larger structures 
overwhelm their ability to properly assign equal shares to multiple partners.
18
   
 This argument follows from the utility functions of orientation types when 
embedded in exchange structures.  Following Bogaert et al. (2008: 456), Willer, 
Gladstone, and Berigan (2013) offer utilities for prosocials, individualists, and 
competitors in terms of payoffs to self and other.  Where i and j are respectively self and 
other in an exchange relation, Ui is the utility of i, Pi is i’s payoff and Pj is j’s payoff, SVO 
actors seek to maximize the following utility functions: 
Individualist:  Ui = Pi                  
Competitor Ui = Pi - Pj     
   Prosocial: Ui = Pi + Pj - |Pi - Pj|   
When interacting in exchange structures, competitors act as if they were 
individualists. Experimental participants who were measured to be competitors prior to 
interaction have repeatedly accepted less than favorable payoffs in order to avoid 
confrontation such that their actions mimicked those of individualists within the 
                                                             
18 In fact, SVOs in general have, to my knowledge, been conceptualized dyadically.  The definition of 
SVO, as well as the definitions of the three major orientation types, relies on relations with maximally one 
partner.  If SVOs are designed for dyadic relations, then they do not necessarily apply to the strong power 
structures in Chapter 2.  As I explain in this section, it is possible to adjust proself utilities to account for 
multiple relations, but the prosocial utility is not so easily adjusted.   
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experiments.  When placed in an exchange situation, the competitors acted as if their 
preferences were modified to be the simpler preferences of the individualist, thus 
simplifying the decision situation.   
The prosocial, however, has the most complex utility function in that it requires 
calculation of the joint outcome of self and other, and minimizing the difference between 
self and other.  This utility is defined for one partner only.  Now consider adding one 
additional relation, or two additional relations, as seen in the experiments.  By adding 
further relations we are moving into a situation where prosociality is under-defined. What 
is equity for a prosocial who is engaged in multiple relations?  Even if that equity value 
were known, any attempt to calculate it would create a management overload. 
For example, imagine a prosocial placed in a null branching network similar in 
structure to the branching structure in Figure 1.1.  In this null structure, the prosocial 
occupies a central position and is connected to three peripherals, with all of whom the 
central can exchange.  Each relation has a resource pool of 24 points to be divided.  In 
order for points to be equally shared in each round, the prosocial central should seek 6 of 
the 24 points from each peripheral.  At the end of each round, each actor will have earned 
a total of 18 points.   
Thus, for a prosocial occupying a central position in any null branching structure 
with equal resource pools, in which P is the equality-maximizing payoff to the central in 
any given relation, RP is the resource pool in any relation, and x is the total number of 
positions in the structure, 
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 As an additional example, for a central prosocial with five peripheral positions and 
resource pools of 30 points, 






   
In such a structure, the prosocial central should not seek 15 points in each 
relation, but only 5 points, such that each position will earn 25 points at the conclusion of 
the round. Nevertheless, not all prosocials will see equal overall payoffs as most 
equitable and may prefer to divide points equally in each relation. If so, each decision is 
simpler, but making the decision on what is equitable is not.   
Will prosocial participants in experimental settings be able to make these 
calculations while managing two, three, or more relations in a timed round of exchange? 
Moreover, would any prosocial actually settle on Equation 1 when it appears to contradict 
the second factor (- |Pi - Pj|) of its utility equation? Of course this last question reifies 
both the prosocial’s preferences and mental processes both of which may not be known 
or knowable.  The problematic for the prosocial in a structure of multiple relations comes 
to this.  Seeking equity in the structure produces inequality in each relation whereas 
seeking equity in each relation produces inequality in the structure.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
These current results and concluding analyses strengthen the argument that social values 
are best defined as flexible and situational states. While SVO is often considered a trait 
that is stable across time, many researchers also recognize that these traits can be 
moderated by situational influences (Messick and McClintock 1968; Van Lange and 
Semin-Goossens 1998; Sheldon 1999; Van Lange 2000; Smeesters et al. 2003; Bogaert et 
 
80 
al. 2008, Van Lange et al. 2011).  We now have 2 more studies with experimental 
evidence in favor of the argument that structural conditions can dampen SVO effects.   
A potential contribution of this research and the above arguments is an 
implication of the power of the rational actor model on the one hand, and the efficacy of 
social structures in determining behavior on the other.   Two statements can be made 
regarding how this dissertation may speak to the rational choice literature (Kroneberg and 
Kalter 2012).  First, the interest in seeking other-regarding behaviors rather than self-
interest is not necessarily at odds with the basic assumptions of rational choice theory.  
The argument that proselfs and prosocials hold different sets of preferences is not 
contradictory to rational choice, so long as they are acting based on “an alternative that is 
optimal in terms of their preferences, given their beliefs and the constraints they face” 
(Kroneberg and Kalter 2012:81).  It can be argued that both prosocials and proselfs act 
rationally when they seek to maximize their preferences, even if those preferences are not 
identical in all situations. 
Furthermore, this research suggests that multiple models of rationality are not 
necessary for predicting behavior within economic exchange structures.  My findings 
imply that behaviors, and perhaps preferences, often overlap or converge under such 
conditions.  These findings defend the parsimony and usefulness of the rational actor 
model.  Under economic exchange conditions, accounting for actors’ social values prior 
to entering such a structure provides us with no greater understanding of behavior than 
the approximation already given by ‘economic man.’   The rational actor is sufficient in 
accounting for economic exchange behavior; the addition of SVO utilities would lessen 
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theoretical parsimony, thus challenging Einstein’s call for “irreducible elements as simple 
and few in number as possible” ([1933] 1954:272).   
Popper ([1957] 2002) also argues for an assumption of rationality in order to be 
able to generate simple models of social action.  What can be gained by assuming 
multiple types of rationality, rather than one type, such as ‘economic man?’  This 
approach simply adds unnecessary complexity and precludes our ability to generate 
predictions with parsimony or precision.  In fact, Popper argues that adding or accounting 
for complexity is misguided.  He states that “the old belief that the description of a social 
situation should involve the mental and perhaps even physical states of everybody 
concerned (or perhaps that it should even be reducible to them) . . . is not justified” 
([1957] 2002:129). 
SVO effects are evident in many circumstances, but they also need not be applied 
to many other conditions in human interaction.  Within social structures such as 
exchange, conditions overwhelm individual differences.  Interaction with others, such as 
negotiation in exchange, prevents actors from making decisions based solely on their 
individual preferences.  In order to benefit, it is rational to conform to the conditions set 
forth by the structure.  Actors must negotiate and reevaluate preferences in order to reach 
agreements, and the conditions set forth by connection type impact behavior, regardless 
of SVO.  For example, the conditions of strong power networks imply that it is rational 
for peripherals to compete with others in order to avoid exclusion from exchange.  
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
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In this dissertation, I have reviewed the theory integration of Network Exchange Theory 
and Social Value Orientations.  The expectations prior to experimental research were 
drastically different from the results of two sets of experiments.  Predictions derived from 
embedding social values into exchange structures suggested that prosocials and proselfs 
should differ; proselfs should earn more than prosocials, and they should routinely 
exercise power over prosocials across structures.  What was found, instead, was a 
consistent pattern in which prosocials’ payoffs frequently could not be distinguished from 
those of proselfs.  Even when negotiation processes indicated differences between 
prosocials and proselfs, the end points of negotiations, completed exchanges, were more 
often similar than different. 
Future directions should seek out other conditions under which we could see 
converging, rather than contrasting behaviors among SVO actors.  Simpson and R. Willer 
(2008) provide one such example: public knowledge of generosity.  Prosocials were 
generous in both a private setting and a public setting, but proself in a public setting were 
more generous than proselfs in a private setting.  The reputational incentives connected 
with public knowledge of their action led to prosocial behavior.   
A possible experiment could investigate other conditions in which the actions of 
prosocials and proselfs could converge, in this case converging in proselfish behavior.  
Because we have numerous examples of proselfs shifting to cooperative behavior, my 
interest here is in the prosocial shift.  I find this of particular interest because we perhaps 
think of proselfs as being able to manipulate and maneuver more easily through social 
situations.  Yet we have evidence that prosocials are not naïve navigators in their social 
worlds, of whose generosity can be exploited by others.  More importantly, we now have 
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experimental tests of SVO within social structures, where SVO effects are diminished.  
What is the next step in this line of research? 
A potential direction for future research follows from the ample amount of 
research showing that SVO effects are susceptible to situational influences.  Experimental 
participants could be run through a series of social structures and strategic games to 
examine how their behaviors potentially shift based on the situational conditions.  If 
individuals act prosocially in structures which suggest cooperation is rational, but 
compete in economic exchange conditions or in a hierarchy/mobility structure, this would 
lend further support to the above argument.  If individuals are measured as having 
prosocial orientation and maintain such an orientation throughout the series of tests, then 
this would support the argument that SVOs are stable across time and conditions.   
More specifically, future research could explore embedding social values in 
exchange networks under new conditions.  One possible project could investigate SVO 
effects in reciprocal exchange, rather than economic exchange.  How might interaction in 
reciprocal exchange relations be different from those in economic exchange? 
Reciprocal exchange (Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 1995; Molm et al. 1999) 
differs from economic exchange in that it is nonnegotiated and noncooperative.  
Economic exchange is a negotiated process that is cooperative, in that actors “jointly 
bargain over the terms of a transaction that provides benefits for both; those terms are 
known and agreed upon in advance” (Molm et al. 1999:876). The agreed upon terms are 
binding.  Reciprocal exchange, however, involves separate actions with no binding 
agreements.  The individual who acts first has no guarantee of his or her action being 
reciprocated in the future.   
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Regarding SVO actors, how might they differ or converge under such exchange 
conditions?  Returning to the issue of time, we should perhaps expect outcomes to differ 
based on single-trial or repeated interactions.  In a one-shot round of reciprocal exchange, 
I would expect prosocials to be more willing to initiate exchange with a partner, as well 
as reciprocate cooperative behavior.  In repeated rounds of reciprocal exchange, 
prosocials should remain likely to cooperate, and the shadow of the future should 
increase participation levels among proselfs. 
Additionally, prior SVO research utilizing priming conditions provides a 
possibility for further investigation (Hertel and Fiedler 1994, 1998; Chen et al. 2001; 
Smeesters et al. 2003).  Much of this research on priming has examined its influence on 
cooperative behavior.  Work by Hertel and Fiedler (1994, 1998) and Smeesters and 
colleagues (2003) has found that the effects of priming can be mitigated by the 
consistency of an individual’s SVO (low or high).   Chen and colleagues found that 
communally oriented individuals associate power with social responsibility goals, while 
exchange oriented individuals associate it with self-interested goals (2001:176).  When 
primed with power, communally oriented individuals acted more “responsibly” and 
attended to their ostensible partners’ needs, while exchange oriented individuals attended 
to their own needs when primed with power.   
Following from these previous studies, I argue that we should consider how 
priming can have an impact on negotiations in economic exchange.  Will priming lead to 
behavioral differences between prosocials and proselfs?  Specifically, building from the 
work of Chen and colleagues (2001), will power-related primes lead to contrasting 
behaviors in exchange by activating different sets of goals for prosocials and proselfs?  It 
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could be argued that prosocials are similar to “communally oriented individuals” who 
“are primarily focused on responding to the needs and interests of others;” proselfs, by 
contrast, may correspond to “[e]xchange-oriented individuals,” who “tend not to attend to 
others' needs and interests, but rather are focused primarily on keeping a ‘tally’ of the 
giving and receiving of benefits” (Chen et al. 2001:175).   
If power-related primes were to activate social responsibility among prosocials in 
exchange networks, we could perhaps see greater attention to joint outcomes in exchange.  
For example, prosocial centrals in strong power structures might engage in equality-
maximizing behaviors rather than exploitation.  I would anticipate proselfs’ behaviors to 
remain unchanged or tend toward a greater degree of exploitation due to priming with 
power cues.  An alternative argument is that the norms associated with economic 
exchange, such as self-interest and competition, may still outweigh the influence of 
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